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IN THE UfAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KRISTEN PULHAM, 
Petitioner. 
v. 
J WILLIAM KIRSLING 
Case Nos: 20150577 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant: 1:0 UTAH CODE ANN. §78.A-4-103(2)(h) and UT. 
R .,_\pp_ P. 3 over this appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated September 
5, 2014 (the '"Findings''), the Amended Decree of Diwrce Following an Earlier Bifurcated Deme, 
dated November 4, 2014 (the "Decree''), and the Order De,qing Motion far New Ttia4 dated 
June 17, 2015 C"Post-Judgment Deniar') (collectively the "Judgments"), of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. A copy of the Judgments 
are attached hereto as .Addendums " ... \," ''B/' and "C," respectively, and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
ISSUE I: 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the tTial court err in imputing Pu/ham's income at $30 per month far child 
support calculation purposes, Jailing to consider and set forth findings as required IJy 
UTAH CODE Al'\JN. §78B-12-203(5) and (7); additionaf!y, did the trial murt 
err in failing to provide relief to J.(jrslingpursuant to UT R 0V. P. 59(a)(6) to 
comet the insrefficienq of the evidence towards these statutory factors in post-
judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: ''The trial court in a divorce action is permitted 
considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." Rqyner v. Rqyner, 2013 UT App 269, 14, 316 
F.3d 455, citing Goggin v. Goggin; 2013 UT 16,144,299 F.3d 1079. "However, we will reverse 
if '(1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial 
and prejudicial error; (2) the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding; or (3) such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."' Id., citing Goggin at 1 
44 (citation and ,internal quotation marks omitted) .. "Further, 'we cannot affinn its 
determination when the trial court abuses its discretion' by failing to· enter 'specific, detailed 
findings supporting its financial determinations."' Id., citing Hall v. Ha/4 858 F.2d 1018, 1021 
(Utah App. 1993). Additionally, the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290,121, 989 F.2d 491; 
see ProMax Dev. Co,p. v. Mattson, 943 F.2d 247, 253 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 953 F.2d 449 
(Utah 1997). "[I]f no evidence exists in. the record to support a district court's finding, that 
finding is clearly erroneous." Or/ob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, 120, 124 
F.3d 269; see Larson v. Larson, 888 F.2d 719, 724-25 (Utah App. 1994). 
PRESERVATION: In post-judgment proceedings, Kirsling challenged Fulham's 
income determination pursuant to UT. R. CN. F. 59(a)(6) indicating that the court had failed 
to consider UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(a) through (d) when determining Fulham's 
income for child support. In Fulham's own Post-Trial Briefing Summarizing Petitioner's Financial 
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Evidence at Trial, dated July 7, 2014, Pulham argued that no evidence ofhe.r ability to eam was 
introduced during the trial other than her own testimony that she eams $0, and that the.re 
were no requests to impute her income proven or requested. Kirsling' s request for relief was 
denied. 
ISSUE Il: Did The trial court err in de':)'ing the fi,umcial .rettl.ement or offsetting amounts owed 
to Pulham, then in erroneous!J der!Jing Kirsling post-judgment relief purmant to 
&tie 59(a){3) and/ or (4) where Kirsling was misinformed f!Y the institution issuing 
his prior monq orders that copies were unattainable and S11Ch error was discovered 
post-judgment wi.th copies obtained, evidencing tangible proof of pt!Jment to Pulham 
that was thus doub!J cha,:ged against him in the ultimate Decree? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The trial court in a divorce action is pen:nitted 
considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." 'R.t!Jnerv . .&t!Jner, 2013 UT App 269, 1(4, 316 
P.3d 455, citing Goggin 11. Gogjn, 2013 UT 16, ,I44, 299 P.3d 1079. '<Jiowever, we will reverse 
if '(1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial 
and prejudicial ettor; (2) the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding; or (3) such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."' Id., citing Goggin at ,r 
44 (citation and inte:tnal quotation marks omitted). "'Further, 'we cannot affum its 
determination when the trial court abuses its discretion' by failing to enter 'specific, detailed 
findings supporting its financial determinations.''' Id., citing Hail 11. Hal~ 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 
(Utah App. 1993). Additionally, the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hudema v. Carpenter; 1999 UT App 290, ,i21, 989 P.2d 491; 
see ProMax Dev. Corp. 11. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 253 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 953 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1997). 
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PRESERVATION: Kirsling submitted a copy of a money order issued to the 
Petitioner to her and given to her counsel Proposals Regarding Case Settlement asking that the 
trial court apply the settlement payment, although he was erroneously at the ti.me informed 
by the institution issuing the money order that he was unable to obtain copies reflecting the 
paid status of the money order. The Findings indicated that the trial court did not apply this 
offset as requested. However, the error in the information was corrected and Kirsling was 
able to obtain copies reflecting the paid status after the Findings and Decree were entered. 
Thus, Kirsling submitted a post-judgment motion citing UT. R. CN. P. 59(a)(3) and (4) as 
grounds to allow the information to be admitted and the Findings and Decree amended 
accordingly. Such request was denied. 
ISSUE Ill: Did the trial court err in de1!Jing Kirsling his requested parent-time through 
deviating from the child custoc!J evaluamr's recommendations absent specific and 
clear findings far such deviation, further detrying relief pursuant to UT. R 0V. P. 
59(a)(l) in this regard as well as erroneous!, detrying compensatory time for denied 
parent time? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: «As a general rule, 'we will not disturb the trial 
court's visitation determination absent a showing that the trial court has abused its 
discretion."' Tmbetzk<!J v. Tmbetzk<!J, 2009 UT App 77, ,17, 205 P.3d 891, citing Childs v. Childs, 
967 P.2d 942, 946 n. 2 (Ut.ah App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION: In the Proposal Regarding Case Settlement filed by Kirsling on July 
7, 2014, Kirsling requested the trial court find that he had been denied parent-time and 
proposed three (3) plans for parent-time. Further, a custody evaluation was prepared by Dr. 
Heather Walker, Ph.D. and submitted to the court for consideration on November 23, 2013; 
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however, the court deviated from the evaluation and denied Respondents requests and 
incorrectly found that the denied parent time mostly occurred when Kirsling was in Arizona. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Pursuant to UT. R. APP. P. 24{a)(6), the controlling consti.tutio:oal provisions, statutes 
and rules are set out verbatim in the arguments below and attached as Addendum "D." 
PROCEDURAL IDSTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petition far Decree of Diwrce ("'Petition") was filed on March 24, 2010. R0001. It 
indicated that Pulham. and KirsliDg married on September 8, 2008 and separated on March 
17, 2010. Id. There was one child bom as issue of the marriage, K.K. (the .. Child'') bom 
November 4, 2008. R0002. The Petition asked that Pulham. receive physical custody of 
K.K. with Kirsling paying child support and both parties being awarded joint legal custody. 
R0003. Kirsling would also pay one-half (1/2) of child care expenses and any unreimbursed 
medical expenses. Id. A Motion to for Tempoi:ary Orders was filed on July 14, 2010 by 
Kirsling. R00014. In the lvfotion, Kirsling asked that he receive temporuy sole physical 
custody with Pulham receiving the statutory pa.rent-time and both parties maintaining legal 
custody. R00015. The Motion also asked that child support be based upon statute and that 
insurance and medical expenses also be addressed under statute. R00016. 
On July 14, 2010, Kirsling filed his Verified Answer to Petition far Deme of Diuorce and 
Counterclaim. r'~'). R00017. In it Kirsling submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, 
stating that the parties' had difficulties in their mamage, and that there was one (1) child 
hom as issue of the mamage. R00017-R00018. Kirsling denied all other allegations in 
Pulham's Petition. Id. Kirsling also filed a counterclaim as part of his Answer. R00019. 
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Kirsling counterclaimed that the State of Utah had jurisdiction over the matter, that the 
parties should be aw~ded joint legal custody of the child, and that he should be awarded the 
sole custody of the child. R00020-R00021. The counter-claim indicated that Pulham would 
have parent time and that the child'would be encouraged and allowed to call the other parent 
any time she wished. R000024. The counter-claim requested that the joint child custody 
worksheet be used for detennining child support. R00031. The counter-claim asked that 
the parties equally share the cost of the premium for insurance for KK as well as any 
uninsured medical expenses incurred for K.K R00033. The counter-claim also indicated 
that the parties would equally share any child care expenses. R00034. The counter-claim 
stated that both parties should equal share all extra-circular activities for KK Id. 
On January 26, 2011 Pulham filed a Motion for Temporary Orders asking that income in 
the amount of $5,200 a month be imputed to Kirsling, that Kirsling pay the amount of $622 
a month, and that each party pay one-half of the insurance premiums and uninsured medical 
expenses for KK. R00221-22. On May 2, 2011 the Order on Proceedings Febmary 2, 2011 was 
entered. R00342. The Order found that the daycare provider should remain the same, the 
daycare provider should be utilized for drop off and pick up, Kirslirig should have one (1) 
overnight visit a week, both parties had the nght to first refusal, daycare expenses should be 
shared equally, and Kirsling should pay for one-half of the premium for medical expenses. 
R00344. The Order also indicated that child support would be in the amount of $511 per 
month. Id. 
On March 19, 2012, Pulham filed a Motion to Amend Temporary Orders and for Bifurcated 
Decree of Divorce. ("Bifurcation Motion"). R00710. The Bifurcation Motion asked that 
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parent-time exchanges be at Pulham's hom~ Kirsling pay for all transportation costs due to 
his move, Kirsling not conract or harass the chilcrs school or daycare provider and that he 
not go to P~s place of employment, Kirsling only be given the first right of refusal on 
ove:mights, and that Kirsling be directed to pay his portion of i.nsw:ance and daycare fees and 
set up a plan for paying arrearage. R00712-13. On April 20, 2012 Kirsling filed his Verijied 
Answer m the Motion m Amend Temporary Order.r a11d for Bijurrated Decree of Divorce. R00734. In 
'J the V eri.fied .Answer, Kirsling requested that the divorce not be bifurcated and denied or did 
not have sufficient infonnation to respond to Pulham' s allegations as set forth in the 
bifurcation motion. R0073548. 
On May 7, 2012, a Mimms, L-:av and Motion entered in which the trial court deterrojoed 
that the issue of contempt and the amendment to the temporary orders would be continued 
without date. R007 68. Dr. Valerie Hale was ordered by the trial court to pe.tfonn the 
custody evaluation and the parties were to split the cost 50/50. Itl Transportation for 
visitation was to be as stated on the record, the decree was bifurcated, the parties were to 
cooperate with the custody evaluation, and counsel was to meet within thirty (30) days to 
discuss financial issues. Id. 
On May 9, 2012, the Custody Evaluation Order was entered. R0770. This Order 
required the parties to each pay one-half (1/2) of the evaluation and the evaluation was to 
commence within thirty (30) days of the order. R0771. On May 24, 2012, an Amended 
Cmtody Evaluation Order was ordered in which Heather Walk.er was appointed as the custody 
evaluator. R0780. The Findings of Fact and Conclusi.om of Law for Bifurcated Divorr:e entered on 
7 
June 1, 2012, together with the Bijitrcated Decree of Divorce, dissolving the parties' marriage. 
R0785; R00787. 
On March 4, 2013 a Certificate of Readiness for Trial was filed as the parties had not been 
able to reach an agreement on the remaining issues. R00907. A pre-trial conference was 
held on July 11, 2013. R00926. A new pre-trial conference was ordered to be set after the 
parties' paid their portion of the custody evaluation's fee. Id. On October 23, 2013 a Motion 
for Temporary Order was filed by Pulham. Such Motion asked that the cost and transportation 
of the parties be split equally so that Pulham was no longer doing all the driving as she had 
recently moved from Taylorsville to Tooele. R009 52. 
On November 6, 2013 Kirsling filed his Response to Petitioner's Motion for Temporary 
Orders and Counter Motion for Temporary Orders. R00965. Kirsling indicated that transportation 
had not historically been shared, Kirsling had not interfered with the daycare providers, and 
he does in fact do some of the driving dropping the child off at grandmother's after each 
parent time, indicating he rumply drives less distance because he does not live in Tooele. 
R00970. Kirsling argued that the transportation cannot be equalized unless Pulham moves 
back to the Salt Lake area. R00973. Kirsling countered that he could care for the child 
because he now works from home and it would be easier on Pulliam due to her health and 
pregnancy complications. R0097 4. 
On November 12, 2013, Pulliam filed her Response to Respondent's Countermotion far 
Temporary Orders. R00978. In her Response Pulham argued that she did believe that drastic 
changes to parent time or custody needed to be made because of her physical challenges. Id. 
Pulham indicated she only moved to Tooele because it was affordable and has only asked 
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that KiI:sling do half of the driving for parent time. R00979. On November 13, 2013, a 
hearing on the Motion for Temporary Ordei:s was held. R00983. The court found that to 
equalize the driving distance Pulham shall deliver K.K. to KiI:sling on Tuesdays at 6pm a:nd 
Ku:sling shall return her to Pulham on Wednesdays at 6pm. Id. 
On Januai:y 23, 2014 the Motion and Declm-ation in Support of Parlial Adoption of Cusmefy 
Evaluator's &commendation (''Evaluation Motion") was filed by Kii:sling. R01004. In the 
j Evaluation Motion Kii:sling asked that the week-on/week-off, parent time commence 
immediately and that a pa.rei:i.t time schedule be solidified before July 1. R01005. On March 
4, 2014, Pulham. filed her Opposition to Motion for Partial Adoption of Cmt:oefy Evaluator's· 
Recommendations and Memorandum in Support of Motion tD Strike Exhibits to Respontknts Motion. 
R01047. Pulham argued that rbaoging custody arrangements this close to the scheduled trial 
in three (3) month time was not in K.K.'s best interest and that she needed to investigate Dr. 
Walker's recommendations before she could respond to her recommendations. R01048. 
Pulham also asked that the exhibits that Kirsling attached to his Evaluation Motion should 
be stricken as they reflect settlement negotiations without a resolution a:nd have been 
presented to show Pulham as an uncooperative individual. R01051. 
On :March 6, 2014 Kirsling filed his &sponse to Petitioner's Opposition to &spomlent's 
Motion far Temporary Orderr. R01056. Kirsling argued that Pulham bas bad more than 
adequate time to respond to Walker's recommendations and has not done so and has not 
shown why it would be detrimental to K.K. to spend equal time with her parents. R01058. 
Kirsling made such request to stabilize the life of K.K and to help ease Pulham' s burden as 
she now has a toddler and infant with her when she transported K.K from her home in 
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Tooele for parent time. R01060. On March 11, 2014 the court .denied the Evaluation 
Motion. R01237. 
The Child Cu.rtot/y Evaluation ("Evaluation") was entered as an exhibit by the 
court at trial on June 19, 2015. R01467. The Evaluation found that the 
parties should have joint legal custody and joint physical custody with Pulham 
as the primary residence. R0l 485. The custody arrangement was 
recommended to be one week on/ one week off. Id Once K.K starts school, 
and if Pulham remained in Tooele, it was recommended that Kirsling have 
three (3) weekends per month--or four (4) if there were five (5) weekends in 
the month--and one (1) overnight ~sit during the weekend he did not have 
K.K. Id. After K.K. started school, it was recommended that Kirsling have 
K.K. all summer except for except for Fulham's two (2) weeks of 
uninterrupted time, every second weekend, and one midweek visit that was 
not overnight. Id. Holidays would be subject to statute with Pulham as the 
custodial parent. Id. The Evaluation recommended that should Pulham move 
back to the Salt Lake area, the parties would revert to the one week on/ one 
week off schedule. Id. The Evaluation also recommended that a special 
master be appointed and that no conflict between the parties should be 
present in front of K.K. R01486. 
OnJune 25, 2015 Pulham filed her Motion to Strike Report and &commendations of Parent 
Time, and her Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike. R.cport and &commendations of Parent 
Time. RO1494; R01496. Pulham indicated that the ~valuation's recommendations should be 
changed to allow her to make all the medical decisions and to allow her to have half the 
weekends during the school year and more than half the time in the summer. R01501. 
Pulham argued that the report was weak and that the trial court did not let her expert, Dr. 
Juan Mejia testify about the weaknesses. R0.1497. Pulham also indicated that the Evaluation 
was based more upon commonsense than psychological data. Id. 
On July 1, 2015 Kirsling filed his 'Response to Petitioner's Motion to Strike R.cport and Parent 
Time Recommendations. R01505. Kirsling pointed out that Dr. Walker had been chosen by 
Pulham, that the Evaluation had been received by the court, but had just not been entered 
10 
( 
0 
for a· period of time most likely due to the death of Judge Quinn to whom it had been 
addressed. R01506. Kirsling indicated that Dr. Walker had used her experience, data-based 
testing, psychological testing and assessment tools to determine that both parents were 
capable and that K.K. deserved m:a:iimnm access to both of them. Id. Her determination 
after all this foundation was additionally based on commonsense. Id. Kitsliog states that 
Pulliam. provided no evidence that refuted w-hat Dr. Walk.er dete.tmined. Id. Kirsling argues 
that the Evaluation does not need to be stricken as it is only a recommendation. R01511. 
On July 7, 2015 Kirsling filed bis Proposals R.egarding Case Settlement (''Settlement 
Proposal"'). R01517. The Settlement Proposal proposed that Kirsling maintained no 
attearages in child support :and was owed the amount of $65. Id. Kirsling disputed the 
amount that Pulham claimed he owed her as being excessive. R01518. Kitsliog indicated 
that he had overpaid child support from February of 2011 to August of 2012 because the 
child support for bis other son had not been taken into consideration. Id. Kitsliog proposed 
that Pulham should be paying the ORS handling fees as she wished to have ORS handle the 
child support rather than having mm just pay her directly. Id. Kirsling indicated that he had 
paid Pulham all but $171.29 for his share of insurance premiums for K.K. but that he had 
also paid the amount of $601.78 on February 21, 2013 as a complete settlement for any 
insurance he owed. R01519. The Settlement Proposal indicated Kirsling did not owe 
Pulham daycare reimbursements since those matters had been resolved in 2013 and were a 
result of Pulham's noncompliance with providing Kirsling receipts and using sun:ogate care 
when Kirsling was available and willing to have extended parent ti.me. R01521. Kirsling 
proposed he should not be required to pay one-half of the cost of preschool since Pulham 
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unilaterally placed her in preschool without consulting with hlm, and it does not fall in the 
same category as daycare. R01522-23. The Settlement Proposal indicated the Pulham owed 
him $559.71 for equipment she retained from his business, Apex Digital. R01523. Kirsling 
cited 144 instances of denied parent time for which Pulham should be found in contempt. 
R01524. Kirsling set forth his proposal of parent rime. R01531-32. Also on July 7, 2014 
Pulham filed her Post Trial Briefing Summarizing Petitioner's Financial Evidence at Trial. R01542. 
1bis indicated the amounts she felt she was still owed by Kirsling for child support, daycare, 
insurance premiums, etc. Id. 
On September 5, 2014 the court entered its Findings ef Fact and Conclusions ef Law 
("Findings"). R01566. The court found that the parties could not agree about custody, 
although they believed KK should enjoy joint physical and legal custody with her parents. 
R01568. At the onset of the Findings in fn. 1, the district court indicated that there was a 
substantial delay in the Evaluation being entered into the record likely due to Hon. Anthony 
B. Quinn's passing in October of 2013 and subsequent reassignment. The Findings 
specifically indicate as follows with regard to the Evaluation: 
R1567. 
It is clear from the record that the Parties entered into the evaluation process 
with the intent that Dr. Walker prepare a report and testify at trial if necessary. 
Dr. Walker did testify, and during her testimony discussed the report in great 
detail. To exclude the report at this point would be contrary to the intent of 
the Parties, and would leave an inexplicable gap in the record relating to her 
testimony regarding custody and parenting issues. 
The court determined that the parties would have joint legal and physical custody and 
set forth a parenting plan. Id. The court incorrectly found that the withholding of parent 
time by Pulham was due to Kirsling's geographical limitations and that it was not deliberate. 
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R01569. The court indicated that Pulham would be the primary custodian and her home the 
primary residence. Id. Kirsling was awarded parent time for two successive weekends 
during the school year with him picking up and dropping off K.K. at the school. Id Kirsling 
was also awarded weeknight parent time on the weekends he would not have parent time. 
Id. Such parent time would take place in Tooele. Id. Parent time for holidays was directed 
to be pursuant to statute and that parties were to exe1;cise a one-week on/ one-week off 
schedule during the summer subject to each party having two weeks of uninterrupted time 
so that K.K. has equal time during the summer with each parent. Id. The court found that 
Pulham had proven $5141.50 in child care expenses, half of which was Kirsling's 
responsibility; however, it offset this amount by the $117 .50 claimed by Kirsling against 
Pulham, ordering that Kirsling pay Pulham $2,512.00 in child care expenses. R1574. 
Pulham's income was found to be $30 per month and Kirsling's was found to be $4,580 per 
month, resulting in child support of $548 per month. R01573. The parties were to equally 
pay for medical insurance for K.K. as well as to equally split all uninsured and out-of-pocket 
medical and dental expenses. R01575. Both parties are restrained from making disparaging 
remarks in front of the child and are to communicate via text or email unless it is an 
emergency. Id. 
On September 5, 2014 the court also entered its Amended Decree of Divorce Following an 
Earlier Bifurcated Decree (the "Amended Decree"). The Amended Decree adopted the 
Findings. R01581. On October 3, 2014 Kirsling filed his Oijection to the Decree of Divorce as 
Filed on October 3, 2014. R01597. Kirsling filed this alleging he had not been allowed to 
approve the Decree as to form and that it contained errors. Id. On October 23, 2014, the 
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trial court entered its Order Overruling R.c.rpondent's Oijection to Proposed Decree of Divorce 
indicating that because Kirsling had not pointed out what errors were contained in the 
Amended Decree and because the trial court had not found any errors in the Amended 
Decree it was denying Kirsling's objection and entering the Amended Decree. R1601. The 
Amended Decree was again entered on November 4, 2014. R01613. 
On November 18, 2014, Kirsling filed his Motion far New Trial ("Post Judgment 
Motion.") R01622. Kirsling based this motion on accident or surprise, newly discovered 
evidence, insufficient evidence, and error in the law pursuant to UT. R CIV. P. 59. R01623. 
Also on November 18, 2014, Kirsling filed his Affidavit in Support of Motion for New Trial 
R01625. The Affidavit stated that at trial Pulham denied that she had ever received the 
money order to settle financial issues and that prior to trial Kirsling did not believe that he 
could obtain proof that she had gotten the order, just that it had been purchased. Id. After 
the trial, Kirsling discovered that he could get proof of payment. Id. Kirsling also stated that 
there was insufficient evidence to show why Pulham did not have income imputed to her 
and why his other child's support was not calculated in the child support amount. R01626. 
There was also insufficient evidence to show why the court ignored the denial of parent time 
and did not enforce the timely submission of daycare receipts for Kirsling to pay back-child 
care expenses. Id. Kirsling argued that the trial court has also not shown why Dr. Walker's 
recommendations were not followed. R01627. On December 3, 2014, Pulham filed her 
Opposition to Moti.on for New Trial indicating that Kirsling had not supported his Post-
Judgment Motion with any memorandum, the supporting Affidavit was not signed, and it 
does not show how an injustice occurred if the checks were cashed. R01631. 
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On December 29, 2014 a Motion to Modify Child Support was filed by Ki.rsling. R01650. 
Kirsling indicated that child support should be modified because there was no child support 
worksheet to show why child support was calculated the way it was, no evidence was 
presented to show why Pulham could not be employed, there was no evidence to show why 
her historical earnings should not be used to establish child support, Pulham filed no 
financial declaration to support her claims, the Amended Decree and Findings list different 
numbers of overnights for child support purposes, Ki.rsling's minor son was not listed in the 
determination of child support, and Pulham did not list her out of pocket expenses for the 
medical insurance premium she pays for KK R01653. 
On April 6, 2015 Ki.rsling filed his Memorandum in Support ef Motion for New Trial. 
R01682. Ki.rsling argued that the trial court's focus on going forward and not back 
significantly affected him as most of his evidence at trial was focused on past parent time 
denial and compensation. R01683. He argued that he had been able to obtain copies of 
money orders that showed money he had paid in settlement to Pulham's counsel that he was 
erroneously told did not exist before trial. R01684. Tracing the money order, it was found 
that Pulham had cashed the check using her own signature, but at a banking institution she 
did not nonnally bank with, obfuscating the accounting trail of the funds in her bank. Id. 
This money had again been charged against him. Id. 
Kirsling argued that ordering his midweek visit to be in Tooele affecting his time with 
K.K. as the drive would take up much of his time. R01685. Kirsling indicates there was no 
evidence given as to why Pulham' s income was not imputed based upon her historical 
earnings. Id. The child support Kirsling pays for his minor son was also not taken into 
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cons,ideration. Id. Kirsling also argued that the court did not take into consideration that 
Pulham had not given Kirsling receipts for daycare as was required by statute. R01686. He 
also set forth what he believed was an adequate and reasonable schedule for parent time. 
R01688. Kirsling indicated that there were no findings as to why Pulham's child support 
was not based on her historical earnings or why the support Kirsling pays for his other child 
was not included in the child support calculation. R01691. He argues there are no findings 
as to why Pulham was allowed to claim daycare expenses without complying with statute 
with regards to receipts and surrogate care. R01693. Based upon all of these issues Kirsling 
requested a new trial. R01699. 
On April 18, 2015, Pulham filed her Opposition and Oijection to a Memorandum in Support 
of Motion far New Trial and R.equest far Fees. R0l 703. Tiris Opposition argues that Kirsling did 
not demonstrate that he was entitled to a new trial and should be dismissed on procedural 
grounds. R01704. On June 17, 2015 the trial court filed its Order Denying Motion far New Trial 
(the "Post-Judgment Denial") denying Kirsling's Motion for New Triil. R01714;R01720. 
The court indicated that Kirsling's motion was only a complaint of the outcome rather than 
any actual error. Id. On July 17, 2015 Kirsling's Notice of Appeal was filed from the Post-
Judgment Denial R0l 728. 
Additionally on July 17, 2015 Kirsling filed his Petition to Modify the Decree of the Divorce 
(''Modification Petition"). R0l 722. Kirsling argued that · a substantial change of 
circumstances had occurred because he had now moved closer to Pulham and the' custody 
schedule should now be modifi~d to a one week on/ one week off schedule. Id. On 
September 8, 2015, Pulham filed her Mo,tion to Dismiss R.espondent'.r Petition to Modijj, Decree of 
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Divorce or, in the Alternative, Change Venue (''Dismissal Motion"). R01739. Pulham argued 
that there was no claim stated upon which relief could be granted since there had not be a 
change in circumstances sufficient to modify the decree. Id. On December 8, 2015 a 
he~ was held on the Dismissal Motion. R01825. At the hearing, the Petitioner did not 
argue the Dismissal motion at all, and the Comm. discussed case laws that supported the 
Respondent's Petition to Modify. He then dismissed the Dismissal Motion. On December 
22, 2015 Pulham filed her Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation on Motion to Dismiss 
Respondent's Petition to Modify Divorce Decree. R01830. Pulham argued that the Dismissal 
Motion should not be dismissed and objected to any and all findings supporting that 
conclusion. Id. Pulham also untimely filed her Answer to Petition to Modify Deme ef Divorce on 
December 8, 2015. R01835. 
On December 29, 2015 Kirsling filed his Response to Petitioner's Oijection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation on Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree 
ef Divorce or in the Alternative a Change ef Venue. R01846. 
On February 25, 2016, the trial court entered its Order De1!Jing Respondent's Petition to 
Modify Decree oJDivorce in which it denied the Petition. R01884. The trial court indicated that 
although Kirsling's relocation closer to the minor child was in fact a benefit to all parties it 
alone was not a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant a modification. 
R01886. Kirsling has appealed the denial of his Modification Petition. See, Appellate Case 
No. 20160236. This Court denied Kirsling's request to consolidate the appeals thereafter. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Trial June 19; 2014 
A. Testimony of Kristen Pulham-Loader 
Pulham testified that she had been married to Kirsling and that they had one (1) child 
together. R01908. She testified that she lived with Kirsling in Taylorsville when K.K. was 
born. R1909. Pulham testified that she was the one who did the majority of the care for 
KK. when she was born, including having one of the grandmothers watch her while she was 
working because Kirsling was sleeping and unable to care for her. R1910. She testified that 
she returned to work at Convergys after eight (8) weeks of maternity leave and that her sister 
watched K.K. Tuesday through Friday while she worked. Id. Pulham testified that both 
parties were working full time at the time K.K. was born. Id. She testified that she did the 
shopping, cleaning, laundry, cared for K.K., etc. during the marriage and the same pattern 
has continued to today. R01911. Pulham testified that Kirsling still did not interact with 
K.K. when he was not working and they separated twice before divorcing. R01912. She 
testified that Kirsling had discovered she wanted to leave, so he kicked her out and she took 
her daughter and went to her sister's house. Id. Pulham testified Kirsling had found papers 
about getting financ:ial help in a divorce. R01913. She testified they did try to reconcile after 
they separated the first time. Id. 
Pulham testified that, when they separated for the last time, she arrived home from 
work and he was angry, told her that her working on it was not working, took away the car 
keys, and kicked her out. R01914. She testified she had to call her Father to come and pick 
her and K.K. up. Id. 
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Pulham testified that after the parties separated she moved into a split level home and 
rented the top portion, while the landlord lived in the basement. ROt 915. She testified she 
had a protective order against Kirsling stemming from the :night he had come into her home 
while her friend was there and she was in the shower. R01916. Kirlsing allegedly showed up 
and started yelling at her while she was getting dressed and slammed her against the wall. Id. 
Pulham tried to call 911 but he slammed her so hard that the phone fell out of her hand. Id. 
She testified that her friend called 911, and Ki.rsling left via the bedroom w:indow and drove 
off. Id. Pulham testified that he was later arrested and she filed a protective order. Id. She 
later dropped the protective order and agreed that parent time would be every Wednesday 
for two (2) hours and an over:oight Friday from 6 p.m. until 2 p.m. the next day. R01917. 
Pulham testified they followed that schedule for a while until one day when Kirsling refused 
to return K.K. and the police were called. R01920. She testified that Kirsling moved away 
around March 10, 2011. Id. 
Pulham testified that Ki.rsling only returned to Utah once after he moved and 
exercised parent rime with K.K. R01923. She testified he sent her a text around the 28th of 
August and that he wanted to exercise parent time with K.K., but he had not seen her since 
April. R01925. Pulham testified Kirsling needed a re-introductory period before he could 
have parent time with KK. as she was only 2 1/2 years old and he had been gone too long, 
but he was welcome to take K.K. for a few hours. R01927. Kirsling did not exercise parent 
time that weekend. Id. Pulham testified he took her for the whole Labor Day holiday and 
then on Wednesday for an over:oight R01928. Ki.rsling then took her for the full weekend 
the next weekend and that was allegedly hard on K.K. Id. Pulham testified that after she 
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returned, K.K. would not leave her side and was very clingy. R01928. She testified that they 
resumed visitation as ordered at that point. Id. 
Pulham testified that in September of 2010 she had offered to let Kirsling have an 
overnight weekly visit with K.K. so that he could spend more time with her, and he had 
agreed to it. R01930. She testified when Kirsling returned to Utah after living in Arizona he 
moved to Brigham City. Id. Pulham testified that after Brigham City he moved in with his 
mother in Taylorsville and then into a rental house with his girlfriend a few blocks from his 
mother's. R01931. She testified she moved from her rental home into her current home 
with her current husband, Nathan Loder in September of 2012. R01932. Pulham testified 
that she moved to Tooele because the houses were inexpensive and it allowed her to be a 
stay-at-home mother. R01933. 
She testified that K.K. had several playmates her age in the neighborhood and she 
played with them three (3) to four (4) times a week. R01936. Pulham testified that K.K. is 
registered to start school in Tooele in September and that the school is only two houses 
away. R01937. She testified there are a lot of activities for K.K. to do in the neighborhood, 
and that K.K. is also enrolled in preschool. R01939. Pulham testified that she decided to 
stay at home since after insurance and daycare she was only making "a couple hundred" per 
month. R01943. She testified that the first day back from Kirsling's home K.K. is always a 
wreck, closed off, fighting all the time, and she cannot play with her friends that first day 
because of her behavior. R01946. Pulham testified that K.K. seems well adjusted to the 
parent time schedule and has told Pulham she likes it. R01948. She testified that she is a 
very hands-on mom and that her husband has always treated K.K. like part of the family. Id. 
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Pulham testified that K.K. feels comfortable in her home that she can be herself there and 
likes to have her friends come and play there. R01949. She testified that she believes that 
K.K. has a good relationship with Kirsling, but that he has made allegations that she has 
denied him pa.rent time in the past, mostly when he lived in .Arizona and a few other random 
times. R01951. 
Pulham testified that for pa.rent time she would like to split the summer and go off 
statutory guidelines for holidays except splitting Christmas at 1 :00 p.m. so K.K. could spend 
time with all her siblings on Christmas. R01955. She testified that during the school year, 
Kirsling should have every other weekend Friday to Monday and a midweek visit for a few 
hours. R01958. Pulham testified that she believed it was good for K.K. to have more time 
with Kirsling than just the statutory time and that it was good for her to have stability during 
the school year. R01959. She testified that there was child support that had been unpaid as 
well as unpaid child care expenses. R01964. Pulham testified that she is asking that the 
court enter permanent child support based upon a calculation of the parties' income. 
R01973. 
She testified that Kirsling's mother had watched K.K. for a couple of weeks a few 
hours per week and that she had to drop K.K. off to her sister aroµnd 5:20 a.m. R0197 4. 
Pulham testified that Kirsling was working two (2) jobs to pay the bills and have money for 
toys, and that she was not involved in any of the family bookkeeping. R01975. She testified 
she believed she could not have a co-parenting relationship with Kirsling because it was his 
way or no way and he would not discuss things with her. R2019. Pulham testified that her 
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issues with Kirsling did not affect her view that K.K. needed to spend time with her Father. 
R2021. 
B. Testimony of Nathan Loader 
Nathan Loader ("Loader") testified he knows Kirsling, has met him during 
exchanges and has been confrontational with him. R02023. 
C. Testimony of William C. Kirsling 
This testimony was obtained through proffer. Counsel indicated that the testimony 
· given by Pulham about the earlier part of their marriage was truth in part and historical 
rewrite in parts. R2032. Counsel informed the court that Kirsling believed that there were 
significant differences in Pulham's version of what happened when he went to her 
apartment, and what had actually happened. Id. 
Counsel proffered that Kirsling has no communication problems with his first ex-
wife or his current fiancee. R2033. Kirsling has no problems with parent time with his son. 
He and his ex-wife adjust the time as needed easily. Id. It was proffered that the amount of 
child support Pulham alleged was in arrears is incorrect. R02036. There was a good amount 
of time that K.K. was in daycare · that Kirsling and his mother were available to provide 
surrogate care. R02044. Kirsling's counsel proffered he did not receive any child care 
receipts, and did not know who was providing daycare. R02046. Counsel indicated there 
was a period of time that he was paying the whole insurance premium for KK., for which he 
was not reimbursed. R0204 7. 
Kirsling was available for daycare every Friday from July of 2010 to September of 
2010 when his employment with Novacare ended. R02124. Counsel proffered that he was 
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available to care for the minor child at these times. R02125. Kirsling had a difficult time 
finding work in Utah which was why he went to Arizona for further education to enable him 
to find employment. Id. Counsel proffered that, after his return from Arizona, he was also 
able to provide child care from August of 2011 to January of 2012. Id. 
Kirsling's child support had been inco.ttectly calculated at the February 2011 hearing. 
R02127. Counsel proffered that the account information used to calculate child support was 
inco.ttect because Pulham' s income was included in the sum listed as his, and the child 
support he pays for his son from another relationship was not calculated as part of it. Id. 
This error led to an overpayment of $799.00. Id. Counsel cited McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 
UT App 382 for the proposition that a tribunal can retroactively correct miscalculations in 
support awards from the service of the pleading until the final order enters. Id. 
Counsel proffered that since March of 2010, Kirsling had been denied parent time 
one hundred and sixteen (116) times. R02128. She proffered that Kirsling believed that it 
was in K.K's best interest to have maximum access to both parents. R02139. Counsel 
proffered information about Kirsling's home, the amenities close by, activities KK enjoyed, 
and his employment and work at home with iTOK. R21041. She proffered that Kirsling 
had a good relationship with his first ex-wife and that he was home when his son came 
home from school. R02142. Counsel proffered that Pulham's parent time request gives 
Kirsling less time with KK. than he was already exercising. R02144. She then proffered 
Kirsling' s parent time request, which was that K.K. would go to the elementary school in his 
ncighborhood until third grade so she could go to school with her brother and then attend a 
school in Pulham's neighborhood. R02144. Counsel proffered that the parties should do a 
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four/ three split and that the parties would alternate having K.K. Sunday-Tuesday, or 
Wednesday-Friday and then alternate Saturdays. R02145. She also proffered that Kirsling 
liked the idea of having a third party involved to help them communicate as Dr. Walker had 
recommended. R0214 7. 
Kirsling agreed with his counsel's proffer as his testimony. R02149. He testified he is 
committed to working on the relationship with all of K.K.'s other parents going forward so 
they can work together. R02150. 
D. Testimony of Dr. Heather Walker 
Dr. Heather Walker ("Walker") is the appointed custody evaluator in this matter. 
R02052. She testified that to do the evaluation she interviewed the parties, observed them 
with the minor child, conducted psychological tests, and made at-home visits. Id. Walker 
testified that she did home visits; however, K.K. was not feeling well at the visit at Kirsling's 
home. R02055. At the end of the settlement conference she recommended that the parties 
have joint legal and physical custody and no final say as to the parent coordinator. R02057. 
Walker testified the parent coordinator recommendation was made because the parties had a 
hard time communicating. Id. She recommended that, until K.K. went to school, Kirsling 
should have parent time every weekend with standard holidays and, when K.K. began 
school, her recommendation was that Pulham have two (2) uninterrupted summer weeks. 
Id. Walker further testified they were to do one week on/ one week off until K.K. began 
school. Id. 
She testified the K.K was attached to both parents, was spontaneously affectionate, 
went to both for comfort and was comfortable with both. R02060. In referencing the 
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Petitioner's denials of parent time, Walker indicated that making unilateral decisions that 
affected parent time and keeping K.K. from seeing Kirsling could be detrimental. R02062 
She testified that she has quite often seen children who are kept from one parent reject the 
parent who kept them and go to the other parent in adulthood. R02065. Walker testified 
that Pulham had put herself into a position so that 50-50 custody would not be possible. 
R02066. 
She testified that she had recommended that they have joint legal custody and that 
Pulham have the final say over education, because she recommended that K.K. go to school 
in that neighborhood. R02072. Walker recommended that Kirsling have K.K. three (3) 
weekends per month and aU of summer except two (2) uninterrupted weeks for Pulham, and 
a midweek visitation on the week or the weekend that he did not have her. R02073. She 
recommended that if Pulham moved back to Salt Lake, then the schedule would go back to a 
fifty-fifty schedule. R02074. Walker testified she noticed no signs of separation anxiety or 
clinginess in K.K. R02077. She testified she had to be creative for Kirsling to get maximum 
parent time and that there was no commonsense in her decision and that it had worked in 
other cases. R02080. ***** not cited Walker also testified that at the time she made the 
written report, she had been unaware that the Respondent was working from home and that 
would have affected her recommendations. 
II. Day 2 of Trial June 20, 2016 
A. Testimony of Rachel Fordham 
Rachel Fordham ("Fordham") is Kirsling's ex-wife with whom he shares a son. 
R02103. She testified she has a 50-50 parenting arrangement with Kirsling. Id. Fordham 
25 
testified she communicates with Kirsling as needed and that their relationship was "pretty 
positive." R02104. She testified that their son has an equal attachment to them both due 
the equal parent time. R02105. 
B. Testimony of Charlotte Dumas 
Charlotte Dumas ("Dumas'') testified that she is Kirsling's mother. R02108. She 
tended K.K. for seventeen (17) weeks, three (3) days per week prior to the parties' separation 
Id. Dumas testified that this had been while the parties were married, and she had not been 
allowed to tend K.K. since the parties separated. R02109. She testified she had asked to see 
KK. at Easter just after they separated and Pulham let her; otherwise she has only seen her 
when Kirsling has had her. Id. Dumas testified that she did not see K.K. while Kirsling was 
in Arizona; however, when she saw her upon his return, K.K was fine with her and had no 
problems with her because they already had established a bond. Id. She testified she had a 
really good relationship with K.K. R02111. 
C. Testimony of Aaron Moran 
Aaron Moran ("Moran'') testified that he was present when Kirsling received the 
service of an Order to Show Cause that had been filed by Pulham. R02113. He testified 
that it occurred at Fulham's residence, and he had gone with Kirsling just so Kirsling had 
someone with him. R02114. Moran testified that Loader tried to serve Kirsling with the 
papers, and Kirsling was just trying to pick up K.K R02114. Loader was chasing Kirsling 
around with the papers. Id. Moran testified that Kirsling finally took the papers when 
Pulham took K.K. back in the house and told him he had to take the papers to see K.K. 
26 
' 
R02115. Kirsling threatened to call the police and after about fifteen (15) minutes; however, 
Pulliam brought K.K out of the house. Id. 
D. Testimony of Candice Leatham 
Candice Leatham ("Leatham'') was Kirsling's fiancee and now wife. R02117. She 
testified they have been together for four ( 4) years. Id. Leatham testified that they 
communicated but had problems like any relationship and that it was a matter of learning 
each party's communication style. R02118. She testified he communicates well with K.K. 
and listens to what she has to say, and KK is open with him. R02121. Leatham testified 
that Kirsling does not favor the children, but is a loving father and the children are his 
number one priority. R02122. She testified his work schedule allows him to get the children 
to school, be home with them in the afternoon, and go to any extracurricular activities. 
R02123. 
E. Pulham's Proffer 
Pulham's attorney then proffered a proposed child support worksheet. R02160. Her 
counsel proffered that the alleged parent denials were not denials, but rather instances where 
Kirsling would not pick up or there was some intervening problem, not straight denials. 
R02160. He proffered that as far as surrogate care goes, Kirsling's availability to watch K.K 
while Pulham worked happened for about two (2) weeks, then he allegedly took her to the 
daycare provider and told them he did not want to watch her anymore, so daycare resumed. 
R02161. Counsel proffered that it was not possible to offset the daycare charges based on 
his availability to watch one day per week because daycare providers charge by the month, 
and it was all prepaid. R02162. He proffered the daycare drop off had to be changed to 
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Pulham's mother's home because of the interactions that Kirsling was having with the 
daycare providers that were not favorable. R02163. Counsel also proffered that Kirsling 
never gave her attorney authorization to accept the $601.78 as full payment of the daycare 
expenses. R02164. 
The trial court asked for additional information regarding insurance and other 
expenses before it would render a decision. R02182. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to provide findings as to why Pulham was only 
imputed income in the amount of $30 when she historically has made a significant amount 
more. The trial court gave no findings as to why this amount was used and why her historical 
wage or at least minimum wage was not. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203, 
findings of facts were required. Further, the trial court also failed to provide Kirsling relief 
under his Post-Judgment Motion challenging the insufficient evidence to support the 
determination of Pulham's income for child support purposes. Findings as to why the trial 
court made this determination needed to be placed on the record and were not, even after 
the Post-Judgment Motion. 
The trial court erred when it denied Kirsling's Post-Judgment Motion when it would 
not consider newly discovered evidence. This denial caused a double charge to occur against 
Kirsling in making a financial settlement. Kirsling had given Fulham's attorney a money 
order as global financial settlement during the pendency of this matter. Pulham indicated 
she had never received it. Kirsling attempted to obtain a copy of the cashed money order 
and was told by the company who issued it that they could not fulfill this request. The 
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amount of the money order was included and not credited in the financial settlement against 
him at trial in this matter. After the trial, Kirsling discovered that he could obtain a copy of 
the cashed money order from the company. Kirsling obtained it and attempted to present it 
to the court in his Post-Judgment Motion but the trial court refused to hear it. As this is 
material evidence that affects the outcome of this matter and was not available at trial by due 
diligence it is newly discovered evidence and should have been admitted. 
The trial court also erred because it deviated from the recommendations of the 
court-appointed custody evaluator without making any specific findings on the record as to 
its deviation. In an effort to equalize parent time regardless of Petitioner's efforts to thwart 
it, the custody evaluator recommended that Kirsling have the whole summer and three (3) 
of four weekends or ( 4) of (5) weekends per month while the child was in school. Before she 
entered school a one week on/ one week off arrangement could be used. If Pulham moved 
back to the Salt Lake area to be in closer proximity to Kirsling, a one week on/ one week off 
arrangement could be used all the time. The court ordered that Kirsling could have two (2) 
consecutive weekends followed by one weekend for Pulham continuing through the school 
year and an equally split summer; however, it gave no indication as to why it deviated from 
the custody evaluator's recommendation. Thus, the trial court erred in making this decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT PULHAM'S 
INCOME SHOULD ONLY BE $30 PER MONTH FOR THE 
DETERMINATION OF CHILD SUPPORT WITHOUT ANY FINDINGS 
AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE AND IN FAILING TO PROVIDE 
KIRSLING RELIEF ON HIS POST-JUDGMENT MOTION BASED ON 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
UT.AH CODE .ANN. §78B-12-203 states as follows: 
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(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to 
the amount imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is 
held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an 
administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for· 
the imputation. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from employment 
opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings 
for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning 
for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found in 
the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, 
income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour 
work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or 
the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific 
findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and 
the condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach 
or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job 
skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial 
parent's presence in the home. 
In Griffith v. Griffith, this Court analyzed the purpose behind imputing of income 
holding as follows: 
A court may impute income to a parent for purposes of calculating alimony 
and child support. See Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
However, the goal of imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing 
their child support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or 
underemployment. 
Ibid., 959 P. 2d 1015, 1018, (UT App 1998). In Reller v. Argenziano it discusses the duties a 
court has in imputing income for child support purposes as follows: 
Before imputing income to a parent, the trial court must "enter[ ] findings of 
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation." Utah Code Ann. §78B-12-
203(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2008). Though voluntary unemployment or 
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underemployment may be relevant when considering whether a party is 
"concealing income or ... shirking in his [or her] efforts to earn income," a 
finding of voluntary unemployment or underemployment is not a prerequisite 
to imputing income. See Rqyner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ,I 10 & n. 4, 316 
P.3d 455 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Busche v. Busche, 2012 
UT App 16, ,116, 272 P.3d 748. The focus of the imputation analysis is 
therefore on the "detailed findings of fact necessary to support a decision to 
impute income" rather than the "ultimate fact or ... legal conclusion" of 
voluntary unemployment or underemployment. Cf. Rqyner, 2013 UT App 269, 
,110, 316 P.3d 455. 
Ibid, 2015 UT App. 241, ,I 3.3, 360 P.3d 768. Generally, the trial court may rely on a. patty's 
income at the time of trial for purposes of determining alimony or child support. See Griffith 
v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Utah Ct.App.1998). But a trial court "may impute gross 
income" to a spouse after "deterrnin[mg] that underemployment ... exists." Hill v. Hill, 869 
P.2d 963, 964-65 (Utah App.1994). 
UT. R. CIV. P. 59 states as follows: 
(a) Grounds. Except as limited by Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to any 
party on any issue for any of the following reasons: ... (a)(6) insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision; or (a)(J) that the verdict 
or decision is contrary to law or based on an error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 
days after entry of the judgment. When the motion for a new trial is filed 
under paragraph (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it must be supported by affidavits or 
declarations. If a motion for a new trial is supported by affidavits or 
declarations, they must be served with the motion. 
"[I]f no evidence exist in the record to support a district court's finding, that finding is 
clearly erroneous." Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, ,120, 124 P.3d 269; 
see Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 724-25 (Utah App. 1994). 
"A reversal of a judgment or decision of a lower court . . . places the case in the 
position it was before the lower court rendered that judgment or decision, and vacates all 
proceedings and orders dependent upon the decision which was reversed." Phebus v. Dunfard, 
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198 P.2d 973, 974, 114 Utah 292, 294 (Utah 1948), citing 3 Am.Jur. 697, Sec. 1190; 3 Am.Jur. 
690, Sec. 1184 (defining "to reverse"); 3 Am.Jur. 699, Sec. 1192 (as to dependent 
proceedings); Larson v. Gasberg; 43 Utah 203, 134 P. 885 (this case not only reversed the 
lower court but granted a new trial which in effect removed the first trial from further 
consideration); Madsen v. MadsenJ 78 Utah 84, 1 P.2d 946, Wamn v. Robinson, 21 Utah 429, 61 
P. 28. Under Black's Law Dictionary the term "reverse" is defined as "[t]o overthrow, vacate, 
set aside, make void, annul, repeal, or revoke; as, to reverse a judgment, sentence or decree 
of a lower court by an appellate court ... To reverse a judgment means to overthrow it by 
contrary decision, make it void, undo or annul it for error." Ibid., Abridged Sixth Ed. at p. 
915. In Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Office ef Thrift Supervision it states that, "'[a] judgment that has 
been vacated, reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby deprived of all conclusive effect, 
both as res judicata and as collateral estoppel.' " Ibid., 35 F.3d 1466 (10th Cir. 1994), citing 
Jeffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1466 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting 1B Moore's Federal Practice 
i-10.416[2], at 517 (1984)). 
At the trial, Pulham testified that she is asking that the court enter permanent child 
support based upon a calculation of the parties' income. R01973. Kirsling's counsel 
proffered that child support had been incorrectly calculated at the February 2011 hearing. 
R02127. Counsel proffered that the accounting information used to calculate child support 
was incorrect because both parties' incomes had been counted as his alone, and the child 
support he pays for his son from another relationship was not taken into account. Id. This 
error led to an overpayment of $799.00. Id. Counsel cited McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT 
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App 382 for the proposition that a tribunal can retroactively correct miscalculations in 
support awards from the service of the pleading. Id. 
On September 5, 2014 the court entered it's the Findings. R01566. Tue court found · 
that in pertinent part therein that Fulham's income was $30 per month, and Kirsling's was 
$4,580 per month, resulting in child support of $548 per month to be paid by Kirsling to 
Pulham. R01573. On September 5, 2014 the court also entered the Amended Decree. Tue 
.Amended Decree adopted the Findings. R01581. 
On November 18, 2014, Kirsling filed his Post Judgment Motion based in part on 
insufficiency of the evidence and error in law pursuant to UT. R CIV. P. 5.9. R01622-'3. Also 
on November 18, 2014, Kirsling filed his Ajjidavit in Support of Motion for New Trial R01625. 
Kirsling argued insufficient evidence to support the finding towards Fulham's income of $30 
per month, stating the court should have imputed income to her pursuant to statute. 
R01626. On December 3, 2014, Pulham opposed the Post-Judgment Motion. R01631. 
On December 29,201.4 Kirsling filed his Motion to Modify ChifdSupport, indicating that 
there was no child support worksheet calculating the current amount awarded, and no 
evidence had been presented excusing Pulham from being employed or having income 
imputed to her. R01650. Pulham had historical earnings; however, there was no argument· 
as to why these should not be used to establish child support. Pulham filed no financial 
declaration to support her claims, and the Amended Decree and Findings list different 
numbers of overnights for child support purposes. Further, the calculation of child support 
did not include Kirsling's minor son for whom he also pays child support. 
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On April 6, 2015 Kirsling filed his Memorandum in Support of Motion far New Trial. 
R01682. Therein, Kirsling indicated there was no evidence provided as to why Fulham's 
income was not imputed based upon her historical earnings, and why she was excused from 
financially supporting the child. Id. Kirsling iterated that the child support Kirsling pays for 
his minor son was also not calculated with the child support determination. Id. Kirsling 
requested a new trial or amendment to the child support calculation based on these points. 
R01699. 
On April 18, 2015, Pulham filed her Opposition and Oljection to a Memorandum in Sup port 
of Motion far New Trial and R.equest far Fees. R01703. This Opposition argues that Kirsling did 
not demonstrate that he was entitled to a new trial and should be dismissed on procedural 
grounds. R01704. On June 17, 2015 the trial court filed its Order Def!Jing Motion far New Trial 
(the "Post-Judgment Denial") denying Kirsling's Motion for New Trial. R01714;R01720. 
The court indicated that Kirsling's motion was only a complaint of the outcome rather than 
any actual error. Id. On July 17, 2015 Kirsling's Notice of Appeal was filed from the Post-
Judgment Denial. R01728. 
Herein for determination of child support the trial court found that Fulham's income 
was $30 per month. However, there was no evidence presented to support this calculation, 
nor to evidence how the court reached this number or why a higher amount of income was 
not imputed based upon her historical earnings. R0184, R01670. Further, no findings were 
made to explain why only $30 per month was imputed if it was an imputed figure. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203 governs the imputing of income; however, it is 
unclear from the t:nal court's Findings whether this is, in fact, what it did. Since no evidence 
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was presented to allow the court to reach the $30 per month amount-with Pulham herself 
arguing in Post-Judgment proceedings that she testified her income was $0 and no financial 
declaration being submitted by her--it can only be preswned that $30 is an imputed income 
figure. If it is not:, then the finding was clearly erroneous for lack of evidentiary support. 
Or/ob at ,I20; see Larson at 724-25. 
Thus, if the Findings are imputing Pulham' s income at $30 per month, this figure was 
required to be the result of a hearing on imputation if her income was contested, which it 
was by Kirsling. UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(a). The court was to consider several 
things in imputing Fulham's income, to wit: "employment potential and probable earnings as 
derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median 
earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found in the 
statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor." UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(b). None 
of these were ever discussed. Although Kirsling attempted to obtain a hearing and reopen 
the Findings and Decree to solve this issue by placing the information on the record on 
Post-Judgment Motion, his request was denied. 
If Pulham was claiming no employment or "recent work history" then her income 
should have been imputed at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week, which as 
of July 24, 2009, was $7.25 per hour, calculating to $290 per week and approximately 
$1305.00 per month. UTAH CODE .. ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(c). This is a significant difference 
from $30 per month and would have substantially decreased Kirsling's child support 
obligation. Imputation at the federal minimum wage level is a matter of course and the 
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default if no other income can be proven, with the exception of very few circumstances. See, 
e.g., Betteridge v. Betteridge, 2004 WL 396481,Judge Orme concurring, citing Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 
75, ,I13, 984 P.2d 987 (referring to statute that considers minimum wage to be default level 
for imputing income in child support cases in all but a few circumstances), citing in part UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(d). Although Pulham alleged that she was only making "a 
couple hundred dollars" after paying for insurance and daycare for her three children, only 
one of whom was the Resi:mndent's child. R01943, this did not excuse her from being 
imputed the default minimum wage, particularly since §78B-12-203(7)(d)(i) states that it is 
only if "the reasonable cost of child care ... approach[es] or equal[s] the amount of income 
the custodial parent can earn." Ibid. There was no evidence as to what Pulham could earn to 
make this calculation, nor does it include payment of insurance premiums, particularly since 
the Findings and Decree require that Pulham pay her portion of the Child's insurance 
premiums. No evidence exists on whether Pulham was physically or mentally unable to earn 
minimum wage, was engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills, 
or that the Child had any unusual emotional/physical needs. UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-
203(7)(d)(ii) through (iv). Thus, Pulham was not excepted from the imputation of at least the 
federal minimum wage as of September 2014 when the order entered quite possibly earlier 
during temporary orders. 
The goal of imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing their child support 
by purposeful unemployment or underemployment. Grijfith at 1018. Pulham by her own 
admission is voluntarily unemployed so she can stay at home with her three children, which 
should have triggered a review of her historical earnings. R01943. She cannot avoid paying 
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her portion of financial support for the Child by this voluntary action that shirks· her 
responsibility to the Child. &Iler at, 33. Pulham's own testimony is also sufficient evidence 
to impute at least a federal mini.mum wage to her under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-
203(7)(c) even as simply a statutory default without any required findings. Hill at 964-65. 
Pulham does have recent work history, however. It is possible that the income 
· attributable to her should be higher since Kirsling is aware she was employed at far greater 
than mini.mum wage. Thus, remand may be necessary for the requisite hearing under UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(a) to determine precisely whether an income greater than the 
federal mini.mum wage should be imputed. &Iler at , 33. This matter was raised by Post-
Judgment Motion; however, the court was unwilling to hear the matter and claimed Kirsling 
was simply unhappy with the outcome of the Findings and Decree. Ibid., dting UT. R. CN. P. 
59(a) and (b). Since it did not correct the error, however, remand with direction from this 
Court is required. 
Should this Court determine to reverse the Findings and Decree for purposes of 
recalculating child support with Pulham's income imputed or imputation determined at 
. remand, it should direct that such corrected calculation have retroactive effect at least since 
the Findings and Decree entered. A reversal would place this case in the position it was 
before the Findings and Decree were rendered, vacating all subsequent actions void. Phebus 
at 974, dting 3 .Am.Jur. 697, Sec. 1190; 3 Am.Jur. 690, Sec. 1184 (defining "to reverse"); 3 
.Am.Jur. 699, Sec. 1192 (as to dependent proceedings); Larson, 134 P. 885 (this case not only 
reversed the lower court but granted a new trial which in effect removed the first trial from 
further consideration); Madsen, 1 P.2d 946, WatTen, 61 P. 28. The original detennination of 
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$30 per month as Pulham's income would be void ab initio, allowing retroactive application 
of the miscalculation undertaken by the court. See, Black's Law Dictionary at p. 915 defining 
"reverse." That determination would have no conclusive effect, thus authorizing Kirsling to 
have the amounts in overpayment returned to him. Franklin Sav., citing Jajfree at 1466 (quoting 
1B Moore's Federal Practice ,I0.416[2], at 517 (1984)). 
Either the $30 per month finding regarding Pulham's income was supported by 
insufficient evidence, or the trial court erroneously imputed income to her absent proper 
procedure contained in UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(a) through (cl) and below the 
default federal minimum wage absent statutory exception. Both paths draw the conclusion 
that the Findings and Decree should be reversed as it pertains to the miscalculation of child 
support, with this Court either imputing the federal minimum wage to Pulham under UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(c) or by ordering remand so that the proper hearing can be held 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203(7)(a) to determine the income based on her 
historical income that should be imputed to her. These errors were prejudicial to Kirsling 
and have resulted in an excessive award of child support to Pulham, requiring correction . 
. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMING THE FINANCIAL 
AWARD TO PULHAM AND DENYING KIRSLING THE 
OPPORTQNITY TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE THAT WOULD HAVE 
AFFECTED THE FINANCIAL AWARD DETERMINED BY THE 
COURT RESULTING IN A DOUBLE CHARGE BEING MADE AGAINST 
KIRSLING 
UT. R. CN. P. 59 discusses the granting of a new trial as follows: 
Except as limited by Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to any party on any 
issue for any of the following reasons: (a)( 4) newly discovered material 
evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
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In Stuart v. State newly discovered material evidence is discussed as follows: 
Newly discovered material evidence," in tum., is defined as "evidence that was 
not available to the petitioner at trial ... and which is relevant to the 
detennination of the issue of factual innocence." Id. §78B-9-401.5(3). Further, 
"~]fit is apparent to the court that the petitioner is either merely relitigating 
facts, issues, or evidence presented in previous proceedings or presenting 
issues that appear frivolous or speculative on their face, the court shall dismiss 
the petition." Id. §78B-9-402(9)(b). 
Ibid., 2016 UT App 86, lff2. In State in the Interest of KC this Court analyzed the concept of 
newly discovered evidence and the requirements attending such detennination: 
[A] moving party must establish: (1) the existence of newly discovered 
evidence which is material and competent; (2) that by due diligence the 
evidence could not have been discovered and produced before judgment was 
entered; and (3) that the evidence is not merely cumulative or incidental, but is 
substantial enough that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result" 
Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, iJS0, 232 P.3d 486 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). If the juvenile court considers and makes findings 
on these elements, those findings will be reversed "only if the court has 
abused its discretion." In re CL, 2007 UT 51, ,r 20, 166 P.3d 608. 
Ibid., 2013 UT App. 201, ,rs, 309 P.3d 255. 
Herein, Kirsling delivered a money order to Pulham's counsel as a global settlement 
of the financial matters that arose. It was proffered at trial that Kirsling paid the amount of 
$601.78 on February 21, 2013 by money order as a complete settlement for amounts he 
owed under the umbrella of child support and insurance. R01519. Counsel for Pulliam 
proffered that Pulham "did not authorize her attorney to accept the payment of $601. 78 as 
full payment of daycare, and she has not received a payment of $601.78 from William." 
R02164. Kirsling went to the company where he had purchased the money order and was 
told they could not produce evidence that it had been cashed or by whom. As a result, at 
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trial he had only the carbon copy of the Money Order to prove he had paid it, and the 
amount was charged against him again in the settlement. 
In the Findings, the district court found that Pulham had proven $5141.50 in child 
care expenses, half of which was Kirsling's responsibility; however, it offset this amount by 
the $117.50 claimed by Kirsling against Pulham, ordering that Kirsling pay Pulham $2,512.00 
in child care expenses. R1574. Kirsling's ability to provide free surrogate care, timeliness 
and statutory compliance of day care receipts including those presented for the first time at 
trial and claiming preschool as a daycare expense were not utilized as offsets to this amount 
and not addressed. 
Shortly after trial, Kirsling was made aware of and obtained copies of the cashed 
money order showing that Pulham had cashed the check using her own signature, but at a 
banking institution she did not normally bank with, obfuscating the accounting trail of the 
funds in her bank. R01684. Based upon this discovery, under UT. R. CIV. P. 59 Kirsling filed 
for a new trial based upon new evidence because he had been misinformed at the time of 
trial that he could not obtain evidence to show that Pulham had received and cashed the 
money order. Kirsling undertook due diligence, but the misinformation received from the 
company through which he purchased the money order was outside of his control. 
Kirsling filed his Post Judgment Motion indicating that he had newly discovered 
evidence that could not have been discovered with diligence and produced at trial because he 
was told it did not exist. UT. R. CIV. P. 59. It was not available to him at trial and it is 
relevant to the determination of the financial award in an offset amount of at least $601.78, 
and up to $2,512.00, if it was determined by the court to be an actual settlement for the 
40 
0 
C 
( 
' 
0 
) 
daycare expenses. Stuart at ,iz. The misinformation was realized after trial when Kirsling 
discovered that it was indeed available. Due diligence would not have changed the situation 
because he was told the evidence did not exist. The newly discovered evidence was material 
in offsetting the trial court's award to Pulham by up to $2,512.00, and relevant as affecting 
the financial settlement ordered by the court. KC at ,is. The evidence is not cumulative to 
any other evidence presented, nor incidental, but is substantial because there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result in the award amount had it been presented. The financial 
award against Kirsling would have been lessened since it was included in the court's 
calculation of child care expenses. Id. Kirsling has thus met the factors as set forth in KC 
to show that the evidence of the payment of the money order was newly discovered 
evidence and he should have been granted a new trial for it to be considered. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in its denial of relief under the Post-Judgment Motion and the award of 
child care expenses in the amount of $2,512.00 should be reversed and remanded to allow 
for presentation of the evidence and argument relating to underlying legal issues involved 
thereon. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE KIRSLING HIS 
REQUESTED PARENT TIME BY DEVIATING FROM THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CUSTODY EVALUATOR ABSENT 
SPECIFIC AND CLEAR FINDINGS FOR THE DEVIATION 
RESULTING IN AN ERROR IN THE LAW. 
In Zavala v. Zavala a court's responsibility with respect to a custody evaluator's 
recommendation is discussed as follows: 
Although a district court is not bound to accept a custody evaluator's 
recommendation, the court is expected to articulate some reason for rejecting 
that recommendation." RB. v. LB., 2014 UT App 270, 1118, 339 P.3d 137. We 
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will not set aside the district court's findings unless clearly erroneous. 
Woodward v. LaFranca, 2013 UT App 147, fl, 305 P.3d 181. 
Ibid., 2016 UT APP 6, 'ff44, 366 P.3d 422. In Riche v. R.iche the importance of findings in a 
custody dispute is set forth as follows: 
It is clear that specific findings of fact are required in a custody dispute. Smith 
v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986). In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in a case 
tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule 
of law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached. Id. at 426 (quoting 'Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). The court explained that the reason for requiring 
such findings is to ensure that the decision of the trial court is rationally based. 
Id. See also Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 42 (Utah 1982). 
Ibid. 784 P.2d 465,469 (UT App 1989). 
In the instant matter, the custody evaluator, Dr. Walker made recommendations with 
regards to custody and parent time of K.K. in the Evaluation Report and testimony. Dr. 
Walker's testimony noted that at the time of making the recommendations, she was not 
aware that the Respondent worked from home. Dr. Walker found that the parties should 
have joint legal custody and joint physical custody with Pulham having the primary 
residence. R01467; The custody arrangement should be one week on/ one week of£ Id 
Once K.K. starts school and if Pulham remained in Tooele, Kirsling would get three (3) 
weekends a month, four ( 4) if there were five (5) weekends, and the weekend he did not 
have K.K. he would be entitled to one (1) overnight. Id. After K.K. started school Kirsling 
would have K.K. all summer except for Fulham's two (2) weeks of uninterrupted time, her 
parent time occurring every second weekend, and one midweek visit that was not overnight. 
Id. Holidays would be subject to statute with Pulham as the custodial parent. Id. 
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In the Findings at fn. 1, the district court indicated that there was a substantial delay 
in the Evaluation being entered into the record likely due to Hon. Anthony B. Quinn's 
passing in October of 2013 and subsequent reassignment. However, the Findings specifically 
indicate as follows with regard to the Evaluation: 
It is clear from the record that the Parties entered into the evaluation process 
with the intent that Dr. Walker prepare a report and testify at trial if necessary. 
Dr. Walker did testify, and during her testimony discussed the report in great 
detail. To exclude the report at this point would be contrary to the intent of 
the Parties, and would leave an inexplicable gap in the record relating to her 
testimony regarding custody and parenting issues. 
R1567. 
The Findings placed Pulham as the primary custodian and her home the primary 
residence. Id. Kirsling was awarded parent time for two successive weekends followed by a 
weekend for Pulliam during the school year with him picking up and dropping off KK. at 
the school Id. Kirsling was also awarded weeknight parent time on the weekends he would 
not have parent time. Id. Such parent time would take place in Tooele. Id. Parent time for 
holidays was pursuant to statute and that parties were to exercise a one-week on/ one-week 
off schedule during the summer subject to each party having two weeks of uninterrupted 
time so that KK has equal time during the summer with each parent. Id. This was a 
deviation from the Evaluation yet the trial court did not make any specific findings as to why 
it made such deviations. 
Under Zavala while the trial court did not have to accept the custody evaluator's 
recommendation; however, the trial court was expected to articulate some reason for 
rejecting the recommendation. Ibid., at ,I44. This did not occur in this matter. Given the 
parties' joint physical custody, the Evaluation indicated that Kirsling would have the Child all 
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summer except for Pulham's two (2) weeks of uninterrupted time, every second weekend, 
and one midweek visit that was not overnight. R01467. However, the Findings deviated 
substantially, ordering a one week on/one week off schedule subject to each party having 
two weeks of uninterrupted time. The only explanation given was that this was to ensure the 
Child had equal time with each parent during the summer; however, the additional time 
Kirsling was to exercise in the summer was to offset the time he did not obtain during the 
school year with that visitation schedule of two weekends out of every three and one mid-
week overnight. The district court's attempt at equalizing the Child's time failed in its 
deviation from the Evaluation recommendations to have the Child stay with Kirsling for the 
summer months and providing Pulham with weekends and mid-week visits. The court even 
noted at the end of its calculated time that it had given Kirsling 40% and Pulham 60% of the 
year, where the Evaluation recommendations would have brought the numbers closer to the 
50% that they should be. Previous to the trial, Kirsling had been awarded 45% of the annual 
parent time. This has resulted in Kirsling ~nd their daughter losing over a month of parent 
time each year from what the evaluator recommended and there is no indication in the 
Findings as to why the Court awarded less time than he had been awarded for the previous 
four (4) years. 
The trial court simply set forth in the Findings what custody and parent time would 
be, without sufficiently explaining deviations. The court made no indication as to why it 
deviated from the .Evaluation recommendations. In Riche the trial court is required in a 
custody dispute to set forth specific findings of a fact. Ibid., at p. 469. This ensures that the 
decision of the trial court was rationally based. Id. 
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.. Although the district court specifically. noted that to exclude the report would be 
contrary to the intent of the Parties, and leave an inexplicable gap in the record relating to 
custody and parenting issues, it nonetheless discounted portions of such Evaluation without 
explanation or viable cause. The court did find that both parties loved K.K. and that Kirsling. 
should have more than the minimum amount of parent time, however, it did not equalize 
such through its deviation from the Evaluation, particularly on its summertime parent time 
plan, which deprived the child and her father of weeks worth of time together. R02178. It is 
impossible for Kirsling to know what the trial court based its decision on in detennining its 
custody and parent time award. Without such findings it is impossible to know if the trial 
court's decision was rationally based. Thus, the trial court committed an error of law in 
deviating from the Evaluation's recommendations without specific findings to support those 
deviations. Kirsling also raised this in his Post Judgment Motion, which was arbitrarily 
denied. Therefore, the Findings and Decree should be reversed as it pertains to the orders 
regarding parent time, and the matter remanded with direction to the trial court to enter 
findings as to its deviations from the Evaluation on such matters as stated herein, or 
direction to amend or alter those orders to comport therewith absent justified findings for 
deviation. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Kirsling respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse amend the Decree and take any such further action as this Court deems 
necessary. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2016. 
Margaret S. Edwards 
Attorney for William Kirsling 
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dated September 5, 2014 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTEN PULHAM, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, 
Case No. 104901246 
v. 
WILLIAM KIRSLING, 
Respondent. 
Judge: RICHARD D. McKELVIE 
Commissioner: T. PATRICK CASEY 
DATE: September 5, 2014 
A bench trial in this matter was held between June 19-20, 2014 in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Honorable Richard D. McKelvie 
presiding. Petitioner, Kristen Pulham, was present and represented by counsel, Steve S. 
Christensen, Esq. Respondent. William Kirsling, was present and represented by counsel, 
Margaret S. Edwards, Esq. The Court heard testimony, received exhibits, and considered 
the arguments of counsel. Now being fully advised, the Court enters its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Findings Related to Jurisdiction and Grounds 
1 Kristen Pulham and William Kirsling (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties1 
were married on September 8, 2008. They separated permanently in March 2010. The 
Parties have one child born as issue of this marriage, Kodie Kirsling, (hereinafter referred 
to as "K.K.," "the child" or "the minor child1 born November 4, 2008. 
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2 The Parties have been actual and bona fl.de residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for more than three months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
3 This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Parties by virtue of their Utah 
residency. 
4 The Court entered a bifurcated Decree of Divorce on June 1, 2012, reserving 
issues of custody, child support and other financial issues to be resolved at trial 
S Since the dissolution of the marriage, Petitioner has remarried and currently 
resides with her husband, Nathan Loader. They have one son, Kanyon. 
Findings Related to Custody 
6 As noted above, the Parties have one child born as issue of this marriage, 
K.K., born November 4, 2008. No other children are anticipated as a result of this union. 
7 Petitioner married Nathan Loader, and they have one child as a result of that 
union. Respondent is currently unmarried but is living in Taylorsville, Utah with his 
girlfriend Candice Leatham and her children. He also has an older son, Michael, from a 
marriage that preceded his marriage to Petitioner. 
8 A custody evaluation was prepared by Dr. Heather Walker, Ph.D. and 
submitted to the Court on November 23, 2013. However, the report was not introduced 
into the record until June 19, 2014, the first day oftrial.1 
I Petitioner has filed a motion to strike Dr. Walker's report and recommendations of parent time. The Comt denies 
that motion, and the report and her testimony will be made part of the record. Although the report was not entered 
into the record until trial, that delay appears to result from a sequence of events that began with the ttagic and untimely 
death of Hon. Anthony B. Quinn in late October, 2013, and the subsequent re-assignment of the case at about the time 
the evaluation was submitted. It is clear from the record that the Parties entered into the evaluation process with the 
intent that Dr. Walker prepare a report and testify at trial if necessary. Dr. Walker did testify, and during her 
testimony discussed the report in great detail. To exclude the report at 1bis point would be contrmy to the intent of the 
P~es. and would leave an inexplicable gap in the record relating to her testimony regarding custody and parenting 
issues. 
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9 Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA), Utah is the child's home state because the child lived in Utah for at least six (6) 
months immediately preceding the commencement of this action. Therefore, this Court has 
jurisdiction to address child custody, visitation, and support matters. There are no other 
civil, criminal, or juvenile court proceedings involving the Parties' minor child that would 
interfere with this Court's exercise of jurisdiction. 
10 Custody is a hotly contested issue between the Parties. 
11 Each party believes it is-in the best interest of K.K. to enjoy joint physical and 
legal custody with her parents. However, the Parties are in sharp disagreement about the 
details of that custody, such as where K.K. should be enrolled in school, and with which 
parent she should primarily reside. 
12 Petitioner lives in Tooele, Utah with her new husband, Nathan Loader, their 
son Kanyon, and K.K. 
13 Respondent lives in Taylorsville, Utah with his girlfriend Candice Leatham 
and her son. Respondent's older son lives with them part-time pursuant to a custody 
. . 
arrang~ment between Respondent and that child's mother. 
14 The decision regarding legal and physical custody determinations is 
governed by Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code. Absent special circumstances, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child Utah 
Code Ann.§ 30-3-l0(l)(b). No such presumption exists for decisions regarding physical 
custody: however the Court is tasked to determine the parenting plan that is in the best 
interests of the child. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(5). 
15 Having reviewed the evidence and considered the positions of the Parties, 
-. -
the Court determines that joint legal and physical custody is in the best interest of the child, 
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K.K., with parent-time as set forth in this order. The Court relies on the guidelines 
established in Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-33 through -35. The Court bases its decision on the 
following testimony as it relates to the factors outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-10, 
30-3-10.2 and 10.3: 
15.1 It is ,clear that the Parties love K.K. very much and want her to be part of their 
lives. 
15.2 Evidence was presented by the Parties that Petitioner has been the primary 
caregiver of K.K. since birth. Petitioner is currently unemployed and is acting as a 
full-time care-taker to both K.K. and her younger son. Petitioner and her husband live in 
a house in an established Tooele neighborhood near schools and playgrounds. Petitioner 
intends to continue to be a stay-at-home mother, obviating the need for surrogate care for 
K.K. during non-school hours. 
15.3 Respondent has resided in various places since the couple's separation. 
Evidence was introduced at trial that Respondent has resided in Taylorsville, Utah, in 
Brigham City, Utah, and in Phoenix, Arizona for lengthy periods of time since the 
separation. Respondent's contact and visitation with K.K. has been inconsistent for much 
of that time, but has stabilized considerably in the past year. 
15.4 Respondent has alleged that Petitioner has withheld contact between him 
and K.K., claiming that she denied him parent time on over 100 occasions. The evidence, 
however, establishes that most or all of the "denied parent time" was the result of 
Respondent's voluntary absence from the geographical area, by pursuing educational 
• I 
opportunities in Phoenix, or by his living arrangements in Brigham City. Respondent 
complains that his mother, K.K.'s grandmother, was prepared to stand in his stead for 
parent time. However, Respondent provides no support for his claim that Petitioner is 
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obligated to allow surrogate parent time to a third party. The Court finds such instances 
the exception rather than the rule and does not find any deliberate attempt by Petitioner to 
withhold contact between Respondent and K.K. To the contrary, Petitioner impressed 
the Court with her willingness to .facilitate K.K's contact with Respondent, despite the 
contentious relationship between the Parties. 
15.5 Respondent requests that the Court order joint physical and legal custody, 
but asks the Court to order that K.K. be enrolled in the school near his home in Taylorsville. 
Respondent's suggestion is that KK be enrolled in that school for 3 years, because her 
older step-siblings will be attending the same school for that period of time. Under his 
. 
plan, school enrollment would then shift to the Tooele school near Petitioner's home, for 
., 
grades 4-6, so that K.K. could attend a few years of school with her younger sibling. Kanyon. 
Respondent suggests that beginning with Grade 7, the Parties would be required to 
mediate regarding the future housing and educational placement which would be in K.K's 
best interests. 
15.6 The Court considers Respondent's request to be impractical and unworkable, 
for a number of reasons, to be outlined in further detail below: 
15. 7 This plan would require K.K. to spend considerable time commuting by car 
be~een Taylorsville and Tooele, a distance of at least 38 miles.2 The Court finds it is not 
in the best interests of a child to spend upwards of an hour each way, before school and 
after school, in an effort to accommodate a parent's preferred parenting plan. 
15.8 This plan would also require that K.K. leave one elementary school in favor o~ 
another, half-way between her elementary school years. This would require her to go 
2 Google Maps direct r<>ute calculation between the cities of Taylorsville and Tooele, not including specific 
addresses. 
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through an unnecessary adjusbnent of surroundings. friends and routine, and is not in her 
best interests. 
15. 9 The Parties have, to date, have struggled with their ability to collaborate and 
cooperate in their care of K.K. The Court finds no evidence to suggest that the Parties, in 6 
years' time, wiU be in any better emotional position to cooperate to meet K.K.'s 
post-elementary school needs on a day-to-day basis. It is therefore in K.K.'s best interests 
that a parenting plan be implemented at the outset. with both Parties understanding their 
responsibilities, so that they can adhere to that plan and provide K.K. with consistency and 
a set schedule. This plan will remain in place unless it needs to be modified due to a 
compelling change in circumstances. 
15.10 The Court does find, however, that a standard parent-time · order, as 
anticipated under §35-3-35, does not provide sufficient parent time for Respondent, and is 
not in K.K.'s best interests. It is the intention of the Court that Respondent be awarded 
additional parent time without creating the attendant travel time that would be inflicted 
upon K.K. by Resp~ndent's proposed p.arenting plan. 
15.11 Therefore, the Parties will enjoy joint legal and physical custody, as defined 
in §30-3-10.2, and Petitioner is designated K.K.'s primary caretaker. Petitioner's home is 
designated as K.K.'s primary residence. 
15.12 Respondent shall be awarded parent time during K.K.'s school year as 
follows: 
15.13 Respondent shall have parent time beginning with the end of the school day 
on Friday, and extending to the beginning of the school day on the succeeding Monday, and 
shail pick up and drop off K.K. at school for those visits. 
15.14 The weekend visits in 15.13 above will be applied on two successive 
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weekends, with Petitioner having K.K. on the third alternating weekend It is the 
intention of the Court that Respondent have parent time for two of every three weekends 
during the school year. 
15.15 Respondent may have evening visitation on the Thursday evening for which 
he will not have visitation beginning the following day. In other words, Respondent may 
have visitation on the Thursday preceding Petitioner's weekend Respondent must 
exercise this visitation in the environs of Tooele County, not returning to Taylorsville 
absent specific permission from Petitioner. Said visitation shall begin no later than 6:00 
p.m. and end by 9:00 p.m. 
, . 
15.16 Holidays will be divided by the Parties in accordance with §30-3-35( c)-0). 
15.17 Summer parent time will be divided equally between the Parties, in 
one-week increments beginning and ending on Sundays at 6:00 p.m. However, if 
requested, the Parties are ordered to accommodate one another with uninterrupted 
periods of two weeks for each during the summer as anticipated in § 30-3-35(1-m ), with the 
understanding that the total amount of summer parent time enjoyed by each of the Parties 
should be roughly equal. 
15.18 The Court calculates that Respondent will have parent time with K.K. for 
approximately 146 nights per year, or 40% of possible nights. 
15.19 All other provisions of§ 33-3-35, to the extent that they do not conflict with 
the· more specific provisions of this Order, are adopted as part of this Order. 
Findings Related to Child Support and Alimony 
16 The Court finds that that Petitioner's income for child support purposes is 
$30.00 and Respondent's income for child support purposes is $4,580.00 per month. 
17 It appears from a preliminary calculation by the Court that Respondent will 
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owe Petitioner $548.00 per month in child support Petitioner is to complete and submit 
to the Court a Child Support Obligation Worksheet-joint custody within ten (10) days of the 
date of these Findings for the Court's review. 
18 The child support award shall continue until K.K. graduates high school or 
attains the age of.eighteen (18), whichever comes later. 
. ' 
19 Neither Party is requesting alimony and the Court accordingly awards none. 
Findings Related to Past Due Child Support · 
20 Petitioner claims Respondent owes her $2,302.00 in past due child support 
She claims $1,655.00 for the period of time prior to 2012 (cumulative). $511.00 for April 
2012, and $136.00 in fees· paid to the Office of Recovery Services (ORS). Respondent 
claims that he has overpaid $65.00 in child support. and should not be required to pay the 
ORS fees. 
21 Petitioner's Exhibit 1 summarizes the balances for Respondent's past paid 
child support Petitioner has provided evidence that Respondent agreed to a payment of 
$450.00 per month, and that there is an Ol!,tstanding obligation of $1,655.00 based on that 
agreement Respondent has not provided evidence to rebut that claim. Accordingly, 
Petitioner is awarded $1,655.00 for past due child support 
22 Petitioner's claim that Respondent failed to pay $511.00 for child support in 
April 2012 is belied by her own Exhibit 1, which reflects a payment of that amount in that 
month. Accordingly, the Court will not grant an award for that amount 
. . 
23 Respondent disputes that he should be responsible for the ORS fee. 
However, as Petitioner points out. Respondent was not consistently responsible for 
i 
payments until ORS intervened. Therefore an ORS fee in the amount of $136.00 is 
awarded to Petiti~ner, since she' would not have otherwise incurred those fees but for 
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Respondent's failure to timely pay his child support obligation. 
Findings Related to Past Due Child Care Expenses 
24 Petitioner claims past, unreimbursed child care expenses in the amount of 
$3,660.00, ~epresenting ½ of the $7,320.00 she claims to have paid, and past preschool expenses in 
the amount of $450.00. Respondent, in tum, claims that Petitioner actually owes him $117.50 in 
unreimbursed child care expenses. 
25 Petitioner acknowledges she owes ½ of the $117.50 claimed by Respondent, 
resulting in an offset of $58.75 from what he owes her. Petitioner has provided receipts and 
cancelled checks evidencing $5,141.50 in child care expenses, rather than the $7,320.00 she has 
claimed. Respond~nt's half of that expense would be $2,570.75. Reduced by $58.75, Petitioner 
acknowledges as an offset, Respondent's outstanding obligation for child care is $2,512.00. 
Re~ndent is ordered to pay Petitioner that amount as reimbursement for child care. 
Findings Related to Tax Deductions 
26 The Court orders that, beginning in 2014 and for every even year thereafter, 
Respondent has the right to claim K.K.. as a dependent on his tax return. Conversely, Petitioner 
may claim K.K.. as a dependent on her tax return in odd years, beginning in 2015. 
Findings Related to Personal Property 
27 The· only dispute between the Parties regards Respondent's claims that 
Petitioner has in her possession a laptop computer and monitoring software, and a cell 
phone. Petitioner testified that she has disposed of the items. In the aggregate, the 
items were valued at less than $300.00 and it does not appear to the Court that the items 
were destroyed maliciously. The Court therefore makes no award for personal property. 
Findings Related to Health Care/Insurance 
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28 The Parties are ordered to share equally in the child's medical expenses, 
including health care premiums, co-pays, deductibles and any other unpaid medical 
expenses. All such expenses shall be paid to the Party who incurred the expense within 
15 days of the other Party receiving proof of payment, including proof of non-coverage by 
the insurance company (EOB), if applicable. 
29 Petitioner currently has K.K. insured under her health insurance policy. 
Respondent's share of K.K.'s health care premium is $62.08 and he is ordered to reimburse 
Petitioner for that ainount at the time he pays child support. 
30 The Parties sharply dispute whether each owes the other for past health care 
expenses. Petitioner claims Respondent owes her a total of $873. 70. Respondent, 
conversely, claims Petitioner owes him $261.77. The Court finds that neither Party has 
met the burden of establishing these claims, and no award for past health care expenses are 
made to either Party. 
Findings Related to Communication/Civility Between the Parties 
31 Each Party is restrained from disparaging the other Party in the presence of 
K.K. and are ordered to immediately remove K.K. from the presence of any third Party 
making any such disparaging remarks. 
32 Both Parties are admonished to exercise caution in discussing adult matters 
such as parent-time, scheduling and child support in the presence of K.K., and should avoid 
such discussions when possible. 
' 33 Except in the case of medical or other emergencies, all communication 
between the Parties is ordered to be solely related to issues involving the care and 
well-being of K.K. and shall be via text or email. All communication between the Parties 
shall he civil and respectful at all times. 
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34 The prohibition against contact via telephone shall not apply for 
Respondent's regularly scheduled telephone calls to KK until she is old enough to use the 
telephone by herself. 
35 The Parties are ordered to refrain from unwelcome physical or verbal 
contact with each other in the presence of KK 
36 The Parties are admonished that using KK as a "spy'' or source of 
information regarding the other Party is inappropriate, potentially psychologically harmful 
to KK, and not in her best interest. 
Findings Related to Contempt 
37 Fin~y, the Court finds that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to 
warrant sanctions for either party based on the allegations of contempt of the Court's prior 
orders. 
Findings Related to Custody Evaluation Fees and Costs 
38 Although not specifically addressed at trial, the Honorable Judge Anthony 
Quinn previously ordered the parties to split the costs of the written report from the 
Custody Evaluator equally. It does not appear that this has been accomplished to date. 
39 Therefore the Court is ordering Petitioner to pay to Respondent half of the 
fees incurred in obtaining the Evaluation and for any associated costs from the report 
issued in anticipation of trial within 30 days of receipt of Respondent's evidence of the 
payment of such sums. Respondent is similarly ordered to provide evidence of such 
payments to Petitioner within 10 days of the date of this Order. 
40 In so ruling the Court is specifically rejecting Respondent's request for fees 
and costs incurred in attending any hearings on this issue or any fees or costs incurred 
other than the cost of the Evaluation and written report, as discussed elsewhere more fully 
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in this Order. 
Findings Related to Attorney's Fees 
41 Respondent has requested that Petitioner reimburse him for some of the 
attorney's fees expended in this matter. Respondent alleges that a large portion of the 
fees expended by counsel could have been avoided had Petitioner cooperated in visitation 
and financial . disputes, which otherwise necessitated the assistance of · counseL 
Respondent also alleges that significant fees were expended compelling Petitioner's 
compliance with Court orders. He requests fees in the amount of $7,020.00 and costs in 
the amount of $5,127.00. 
42 Petitioner, conversely, argues that she incurred increased attorneys fees as a 
result of Respondent's failure to pay ordered support and other violations of the Cou.rt's 
orders. She requests fees in the amount of $2,610.00. 
43 It is clear to the Court that the majority of attorney's fees and costs were 
generated by the failure of each Party to cooperate with the other, and to comply with the 
Court's orders. -Than fact, however, is a side note to the unnecessary litigation and 
expense generated by each Party as a result of their inability to come to agreement on even 
the simplest of issues without involving their respective counsel and, inevitably, the Court 
Neither Party is to be commended nor rewarded for their reluctance or refusal to work 
with one another in ·an effort to resolve disputes amicably. The Court is of the view that 
the future emotional health of K.K. depends, in part, on an ability and willingness of both 
Parties to resolve disagreements respectfully and amicably without the constant 
intervention of outside resources. An award of attorneys fees would tend to encourage, 
rather than discourage, the Parties to seek redress through the legal system instead of 
improving their problem-solving and mediation skills. 
01577 
0 
0 
0 
44 Finally, neither Party has demonstrated that sfhe is unable to bear the costs 
of this litigation, or the other Party's ability to bear the full costs of this litigation, such that 
an award of attorney's fees would be appropriate. 
45 Accordingly, no attorney's fees are awarded . 
. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Parties were previously granted a divorce on the grounds of irrec:onc:ilable 
differences. 
2. The Court has considered all relevant statutory factors and determined that it is 
in the best interests of the minor child to award Petitioner and Respondent joint physical 
and legal custody in accordance with these Findings. 
3. Child support was determined based upon the Parties' stipulated gross monthly 
incomes. 
4. The Cow::t declines to enter.an award of attorney's fees, since the facts of this case 
make such an award inappropriate' and neither Party has demonstrated the other's 
financial need or hisfher own ability to pay. 
5. The Court found insufficient evidence of contempt to warrant any sanctions. 
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Petitioner's counsel is ordered to prepare a Decree consistent with these Findings 
and file it with the Court within ten (10) days of the date of filing these Findings. 
Respondent shall have an additional ten (10) days to object to the Decree prior to the Court 
signing the Decree and entering it into the record. 
,_fi 
Dated this_,o __ day of September, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 104901246 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: STEVES CHRISTENSEN 136 ES TEMPLE STE 1400 SALT LAKE CITY, 
UT 84111-2142 
MAIL: MARGARET S EDWARDS 9891 S HEYTESBORY LN SANDY UT 84092 
09/05/2014 /s/ JILLENE WOODRUFF 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Printed: 09/05/14 14:06:31 Page 1 (last) 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
ssc{akcpla'-':yers.com 
Craig L. Pankratz (U .S.B. 12194) 
dp@ccplawyers.com 
CHRISTENSEN CORBETT & PANKRATZ, PLLC 
340 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 303-5800 
Facsimile (801) 906-5551 
Attornrys far Petitioner 
IN THE TIIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICf COURT 
KRISTEN Pu"LH.-\M, 
vs. 
Wil..LL-\M K.msLING, 
IN AND FOR SALT L\KE COUN1Y, STATE OF UTAH 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
FOI..LOWING AN EARLIER BIFURCATED 
DECREE 
Civil Case No. 104901246 
Judge Richard McKelvie 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law entered by the court on 
September 5, 2014, the court now enters a Decree of Divorce. 
Divorce 
1. The parties were divorced previously in a bifurcated divorce. That order is incorporated here 
in as a final order of the court on all issues. 
Custody and Parent Time issues 
2. The parties are awarded joint physical and joint primary custody of their only child Kodie 
Ivf.arie Kirsling ("KK''). Kristen will be the primary custodial parent and will have the final 
say in parenting decisions for KK, including but not limited to, the location where KK will 
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attend school. Kristen's home will be considered to be K.K's primary residence. In 
furtherance of this order, the following parenting plan is ordered: 
a. William's weekend time during a school year. William will have parent time on 
weekends while KK is in school alternating so that William will have two weekends 
in a row beginning with the weekend of September 22, 2014 interrupted by one 
weekend for Kristen's parent time before William again has two weekends in a row. 
This pattern '\\--ill con°?ue so that William will have two weekends to every one 
weekend for Kristen's parent time during the school year. 
b. William's weekend during the school year will begin at the usual ending time for 
school each Friday and will continue until the usual beginning time for school the 
following Monday. William is to pick KK up from school at the beginning of his 
weekend and to drop her off from school at the end of his weekend. 
c. Holiday Parent Time. The above weekend rotation will not be interrupted by holiday 
weekends. The parties are awarded holiday parent time under U.C.A. Section 30-3-
35. Statutory holidays will trump the above non-holiday weekend rotation, but it will 
not interrupt the rotation. If Kristen's holiday is on one of William's weekends, then 
she '\\--ill have two weekends in a row. If William's holiday is on Kristen's weekend, he 
will have 5 weekends in a row. Holiday weekends include Civil Rights Day in 
January (~ILK'), Presidents day in February, Spring Break, Memorial Day in May, 
Labor Day in September, Fall Break, and Thanksgiving. The parties may switch 
weekends within the rotation but this rotation will be fixed. Similarly, if the two 
weekends during the Christmas break fall on William's weekends, for example, 
Kristen would have the weekend before the Christmas and also the weekend after 
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the Christmas break. If the holiday occurs on a school day and it is William's holiday, 
William will exercise his parent time in Tooele. William will provide transportation 
for his non-school holidays that do not cover a weekend, Columbus Day (if a non 
school day) Halloween, Veteran's Day (if a non school day), Father's Day,July 4 and 
July 24. 
d. Summer Parent Time. The parties shall rotate the weeks of the summer in one week 
increments ending on Sunday at 6:00 p.m. The parties will each be entitled to half of 
the summer and should divide an odd week in half at the end of the summer to 
accommodate such a division. Each party may have uninterrupted vacation periods 
of up to two weeks so long as the other parent is given a reciprocal time. 
e. Summer parent time will interrupt the school year weekend rotation. The party who 
would be entitled to the first weekend of the summer under this rotation will have 
the first weekend after school starts in the fall and the rotation will continue the next 
school year. So if William had only one weekend just prior to the last day of school, 
he will have just one weekend just after school starts before it is Kristen's weekend 
for parent time after school starts. 
£ Transportation. Each parent will pick up KK at the beginning of his or her parent 
time during the summer, during the Christmas Holiday and other incidental holiday 
visitation times in which William's time does not end at the beginning of a school 
day. William will provide transportation directly to school after his parent time in the 
school year which ends at the time school begins. 
g. :tvlidweek time. William may exercise midweek parent time only in the area of Tooele, 
Utah and only on the Thursday before Kristen's regular weekend in the above 
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rotation during the school year. The parent time will begin by 6:00 p.m. and end by 
9:00 p.m. No parent has a midweek visit during summer or holiday parent time. 
h. All other parent time is awarded to Kristen. 
1. The provisions of U.C.A. Section 30-3-35 which do not conflict with the specific 
orders above are adopted by the court. 
J· The parties are encouraged to resolve disagreements respectfully and amicably with 
the future emotional health of KK. in mind. 
3. Child Support. Child support is calculated on the joint custody worksheet and the U.C.A. 
based on the number of days that William will actually have KK. throughout the year. This 
will mean that he will have approximately 7 Christmas days, 5 other holidays, 45 summer 
days, and 78 weekend days for a total of 135 nights with KK during the year. However, the 
nights of parent time awarded to each party may be more or less depending on the schedule 
designed above by the court. Child support is further calculated on Kristen's income of 
$30.00 a month and William's income of $4,580.00 a month, which are the stipulated 
monthly gross incomes. The monthly child support will be $575.00. See Child Support 
Worksheet attached. 
4. Monetary Judgment. Kristen is awarded and William is ordered to pay her $1,791 in child 
support and ORS fees. Kristen is also awarded and William is ordered to pay her $2,512.00 
in child care expenses. 
5. Tax Exemptions. So long as William is current on his child support, medical reimbursement 
and child care obligations and he has paid the amounts ordered in paragraph 13 above by 
December 31 of each even tax year, starting with 2014, he may claim KK as an exemption 
for that even numbered tax year (2014, 2016, 2018 ... ). Kristen may claim KK in all tax 
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years which are odd numbered and in even numbered years when William does not qualify 
due to delinquency. 
6. The cost of the custody evaluation and the custody evaluation report are to be shared 
equally. All other costs incurred, including for witnesses and trial preparation are to be bome 
by the party incurring the cost. 
7. No Attorneys' fees are awarded to either party because both parties have competing claims 
of noncompliance and neither party met the burden to show the ability of the other to pay 
his or her fees. The court cannot award fees in this case when such an award would 
encourage rather than dissuade the parties from seeking redress through litigation. 
8. All charges of Contempt are dismissed. 
9. Each party is restrained from disparaging the other Party in the presence of KK. and are 
ordered to immediately remove KK. from the presence of any third Party making any such 
disparaging remarks. 
10. Both Parties are admonished to exercise caution in discussing adult matters such as parent-
time, scheduling and child support in the presence of KK. and should avoid such discussions 
when possible. 
11. Except in the case of medical or other emergencies, all communication between the parries is 
ordered to be solely related to issues involving the care and wel-being of KK. and shall be via 
test or email. All communication between the parties shall be civil and respectful at all times. 
12. The prohibition against contact via telephone shall not apply for Respondent's regularly 
scheduled telephone calls to KK.. Until she is old enough to use the telephone by herself. 
13. The parties are ordered to refrain from unwelcome physical or verbal contact with each 
other in the presence of KK. 
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14. The parties are admonished that using KK as a "spy" or source of infor:ma.tion regarding the 
other party is inappropriate, potentially psychologically harmful to KK and not in her best 
interest. 
***This order is considered signed and entered of record as indicated on the 
first page..*** 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED DECREE 
OF DIVORCE FOLLOWING AN EARLIER BIFURCATED DECREE to be served via efiling on the 25th 
day of September, 2014, to: 
1v!argaret S. Edwards 
Law Office of Margaret S. Edwards 
5242 S. College Drive 
Suite 190 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Marggretsed'-vards@yahoo.com 
Isl Tan Tones ~ 
An employee of Christensen Corbett & PankratZi Pl.LC 
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ALEO DISTRICT COURT 
Thircf Judiciat District 
. JUN~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIWiY~ ./ 
BY, Deputy Clerk 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTEN PULHAM, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
WILLIAM KIRSLING, 
Respondent 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
NEWTRIAL 
Case No. 104901246 
Judge: RICHARD D. McKELVIE 
Commissioner: T. PATRICK CASEY 
DATE: JUNE 17, 2015 
A bench trial in this matter was held between June 19-20, 2014 in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Honorable Richard D. McKelvie 
presiding. The Court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders on 
September 5, 2014. On November 14, 2014, Respondent thereafter filed a motion for 
new trial pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Motion was 
accompanied by a document purporting to be an affidavit in support of the motion, but 
which can be more accurately characterized as an argument by Respondent's counsel, 
complaining generally of the failure of the Court to find in his favor. After procedural 
delays caused primarily by Respondent's counsel's medical issues (see docket, generally) 
Respondent filed his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial on April 6, 2015. 
Petitioner responded on April 18, 2015. 
It is notable that Rule 59 provides that "in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings 
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of fact and conclusions oflaw or make new findings and conclusion, and direct the entry of 
a new judgment." Rather than seeking such a remedy for what amounts to very minimal 
and discreet complaints regarding the Court's ruling (assuming that Respondent's 
complaints are meritorious) Respondent seeks a new trial. Respondent does not, 
however, establish how a new triaJ would resolve his claims in the way a more limited and 
contextual approach would not. 
Respondent's Motion is based on Rule 59(a)(3) (Accident or surprise), 59(a)(4) 
(newly discovered evidence), Rule 59(a)(6) (insufficiency of evidence) and Rule 
59(a)(7),(error in law.) The Court will address each in tum. 
1. Rule 59(a)(3) (Accident or surprise). Respondent claims "surprise" because "the 
parties were instructed multiple times to not focus on past events, but to focus on 
events going forward." Respondent does not refer to the record, no transcript was 
presented with Respondent's Motion, and there is no indication one was obtained. 
Although the Court advised the parties themselves (not counsel) that their interests 
would be best served if they could put their past disputes in context and look to 
theirs and their child's future, the Court at no time restricted the parties in their 
presentation of evidence to future events. Indeed, much of the trial was consumed 
by the testimony of both parties and other witnesses relating to past disagreements 
about monetary and child-rearing matters, and the Court considered that evidence 
in enterir,.g its findings and order. Respondent cannot legitimately claim that he 
was surprised, let alone prejudiced, by the conduct of the Court in conducting the 
trial. Respondent does not refer to a single instance in which he was truncated in 
his attempts to introduce specific evidence of past conduct as a result of the 
2 
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complained-of admonition. 
2. 59(a)(4) (newly discovered evidence) The "newly discovered" evidence that 
Respondent refers to in this instance of his Motion relates to Petitioner's testimony 
that she did not receive a payment from Respondent. Respondent claims that, 
post-trial, he "was able to obtain a photocopy" of a cashed money order. What 
Respondent does not establish is whether or why he was unable to obtain this 
evidence prior to trial, nor does he establish that the introduction of the evidence 
would have resulted in a different trial outcome. 
3. Rule 59(a)(6) (insufficiency of evidence) Respondent's argument on this score, 
couched under the rubric of "insufficiency of evidence" is difficult to discern. 
Respond~nt alleges that the Court's "finding" "that the Respondent's midweek 
parent ti~e was to take place solely in Tooele, Utah--- is not supported by any 
evidence whatsoever." What Respondent fails to note is that the complained of 
statement is not a finding, but an order. The Court concluded that it was not in the 
best interest of the child to spend upwards of two hours out of a 3 hour visit in an 
automobile on 1-80 between Tooele and Taylorsville. That is a conclusion based 
upon the evidence presented (the residences of the parties and the distance 
between them) and the Court's judgment. based on the child's age and the general 
testimony and evidence regarding the child from the parties, the custody evaluator 
and others. Those are the only "facts" that the Court needs to rely on to make such 
a finding, based on reason and judgment, and the record sufficiently supports those 
facts. 
Respondent also complains that there is no "evidence in paragraph 16 to 
3 
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support why [Petitioner's] income was not calculated pursuant to the UCA 
§78B-12-202(7)(b). (The Court assumes the reference is actually to 
§78B-12-203(7)(b), since §78B·12-202(7)(b) does not exist.) Again, Respondent 
has confused evidence with a conclusion by the Court. The record was dear and 
uncontradicted that Petitioner was unemployed. §78B-12-203(7) indicates that 
income "i:nay" or "may not" be imputed under certain circumstances. It does not 
direct or command that the Court impute income, but merely dictates the 
circumstances under which the Court may do so. Of course, application of the 
statute is subject to review for abuse of discretion, but it is not the basis for a 
complaint of "insufficient evidence." The Court is not required to explain in 
minute detail why it chooses to apply or not apply a certain standard to specific 
evidence. It is sufficient if the evidence in the record supports the Court's exercise 
of discretion. Petitioner was unemployed and the Court did not impute income to 
her. This is not an issue subject to review for insufficient evidence. 
The same reasoning is applied to Respondent's next complaint, that the child 
support order does not give credit to the Respondent for other children (notably not 
all his own) in his home. As Petitioner points out in her responsive brief, 
Respondent did not seek relief for this fact, and did not include any worksheets or 
briefing~ direct the Court to determine how the calculations may be affected by his 
single obligation to his son. Respondent was not married to his live-in girlfriend, 
and had no legal obligation to support her or her children. The Court's failure to 
consider those issues certainly doesn't fall within the confines of findings based on 
"insufficient evidence." 
4 
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Respondent's remaining "sufficiency of evidence claims" are similarly 
unsupportable. Indeed, they appear to be complaints regarding the reasoning of 
the Court and the application of the law to the facts, rather than a complaint of 
insufficient evidence. 
4. Rule 59(a)(7),(error in law) This provision of Rule 59 anticipates that the Court 
may grant a new trial in instances in which there is an error in the application of 
law. It must first be recognized that Rule 59 covers all trials; both jury trials and 
trials to the Court In instances in which a jury is employed and a jury verdict 
reached, it is impossible for the Court, in consideration of an argument of error in 
law (i.e., improper jury instructions, improper argument or conduct of counsel and 
the like) to return the jury to the courtroom and correct the error. 
Where the trial court is the finder of fact, and especially in domestic relations 
i 
l 
cases in "Yhich the trial court has ongoing jurisdiction to enter or amend new orders 
due to changes in circumstances, the granting of a new trial is an unwarranted 
remedial measure, even assuming errors in the application of law occurred. 
Here, Respondent complains that the Court did not apply all of the 
recommendations made by the custody evaluator, and makes the bold claim that 
f 
"the Cqurt never considered the custody evaluator's testimony and 
recommendations when it made its custody determination." Setting aside the 
debate ~ to how Respondent lmows what the Court did or did not consider, this 
'\ 
argument does not amount to an error in the application of law. 
Indeed, as pointed out by Petitioner in her response, the Court did 
incorpo~te many of the evaluator's recommendations. And, as also pointed out, 
5 
01718 
0 
0 
0 
0 
the Court articulated the reasons for its decision regarding custody. The Court is 
not obUgJted to follow every recommendation in the evaluation, nor is it required to 
provide :Respondent, at a minimum, with at least as much parent time as is 
recommeµded. 
Similarly, Respondent's renewed complaint about the calculation of child 
support and the Court's determination that Petitioner had no income (see 
discussiori of §78B-12-203(7), supra) does not rise to an error of law. The Court 
exercised its discretion in determining not to impute income to Petitioner, 
something the statute authorizes it to do. 
The remainder of Respondent's complaints in this subsection of his motion 
I 
can be more accurately characterized as complaints of failure of proof and 
insufficiency of the evidence. As noted above, there is no reference to the record 
in support of these claims, and no transcript of the proceedings has been lodged 
with the Court Further, the complaints themselves defy logic, both with respect to 
an objective comparison to the evidence adduced at trial and within the confines of 
the written statement. (As an example, Respondent complains: "Paragraph 13 
states th~t the Respondent's older son lives with him part time, when in fact he lives 
with him; every other week." How else would Respondent have the Court define 
this living arrangement, other than "part time?" Similarly, the fact that Petitioner 
! 
lived elsewhere prior to purchasing her current home with her new husband is not 
relevant to any factor determined by the Court, and certainly not evidence of an 
error of law. 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction in this matter. Respondent's request 
6 
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for a new trial is unsupported by either the accompanying affidavit, or by his 
subsequent memorandum. Any issues that Respondent believes are unresolved or 
incompletely resolved by the Court's order can be raised by petition for 
modification. Granting of a new trial with its attendant costs and inconvenience to 
the prevailing party is a drastic measure to be considered only when the interest of 
justice demands it. Respondent's reasons for requesting a new trial amount to no 
more than a complaint about the outcome rather than errors in the process. The 
Motion for New Trial is therefore DENIED. 
This is the Order ofthe Court and no further Order is needed. 
Dated this ___ /_7 __ day of June, 2015. 
RICHARD D. McKEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUD 1.i:.-~S/1/P"' 
7 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for ca~e 104901246 by the method and on the date specified. 
MAIL: STEVES CHRISTENSEN 340 E 400 S SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
MAIL: MARGARET S EDWARDS 9891 S HEYTBSBORY LN SANDY UT 84092 
06/17/2015 /s/ MCKAB MARRIOT 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Addendum ''D'' 
Controlling Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
0 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-12-203: 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income 
from any source, including earned and non-earned income sources which may 
include salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from 
anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, 
alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security 
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, 
income replacement disability insurance benefits, and payments from "non-
means-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. If and only if during the time prior to the original 
support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 
hours at the parent's job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excluded from gross income 
are: (a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family 
Employment Program; (b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, 
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social 
Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, SNAP benefits, or General 
Assistance; and (c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a 
parent. 
(4)(a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be 
calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or 
business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-
employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an 
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child 
support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate 
at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts. (b) Gross income 
determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business 
income determined for tax purposes. 
(S)(a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall 
provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court finds the 
verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records 
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for 
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pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax retums. (c) Historical and 
cur.rent earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or 
overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection[/). 
[/)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to 
the amount imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is 
held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an 
administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for 
the imputation. (b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived from 
employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or 
the median ea.ming for persons in the same occupation in the same 
geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. (c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is 
unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 
40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial 
proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter 
specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. ( d) 
Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the 
condition is not of a temporary nature: (i) the reasonable costs of child care 
for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of income the 
custodial parent can earn; (ii) a parent is physically or mentally ·unable to earn 
minimum wage; (iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or (iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child 
require the custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8)(a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's 
own right such as Supplemental Security Income. (b) Social Security benefits 
received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child 
support to the parent upon whose ea.ming record it is based, by crediting the 
amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income 
of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case. 
B. UT. R. CIV. P. 59: 
(a) Grounds. Except as limited by Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to any 
party on any issue for any of the following reasons: (a)(l) irregularity in the 
proceedings of the court, jury or opposing party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which a party was prevented from having a fair trial; 
(a)(2) misconduct of the jury, which may be proved by the affidavit or 
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declaration of any juror; (a)(3) accident or surprise that ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against; (a)(4) newly discovered material evidence that 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at 
the trial; (a)(S) excessive or inadequate damages that appear to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice; (a)(6) insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the verdict or other decision; or (a)(!) that the verdict or decision is 
contrary to law or based on an error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 
days after entry of the judgment. When the motion for a new trial is filed 
under paragraph (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it must be supported by affidavits or 
declarations. If a motion for a new trial is supported by affidavits or 
declarations, they must be served with the motion. 
(c) Further action after non-jury trial. After a nonjury trial, the court may, on 
motion for a new trial, open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new ones, and direct entry of a new judgment. 
(d) New trial on initiative of court or for reasons not in the motion. No later 
than 28 days after entry of the judgment the court, on its own, may order a 
new trial for any reason that would justify a new trial on motion of a party. 
After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court may 
grant a timely motion for a new trial for a reason not stated in the motion. 
The order granting a new trial must state the reasons for the new trial. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of the judgment. 
